Formal types of culture within the development of humanity[[1]](#footnote-0)

<I. The step of religious culture>

<A. The “naturally grown” religion>

1. The animal lives under mere instincts, man under norms as well. A normative consciousness of right and wrong (decent, indecent, beautiful, ugly, appropriate, inappropriate, etc.) interwoven with it goes through all kinds <of> consciousness acts and motivates a corresponding cognizing, evaluating, objectively and socially working act. But not only in the single case: Because man has as otherwise a general consciousness, thus a consciousness of general norms, the consciousness “I shall not act in this way at all or I shall act thus”, the norm may be related to single ones, to groups and to the allness of men: Thus everyone as such shall behave, especially every soldier, every priest, etc.

Norms may be conscious as being de facto accepted, as arbitrarily set “laws” of contingent potentates or a “now accepted” contingent tradition, an untrue one, contingently conditioned as the custom changing from landscape to landscape and on top of that from time to time. Norms though may also be conscious as being absolutely accepted, in the form of an absolutely unconditioned “I shall” and “I may not, e.g. as divine laws, whereby “divine” [60] simply expresses a principle, from which absolute acceptances derive, unconditioned, “categorical” imperatives.

2. In every higher developed culture, or rather, humanity, which is active in cultural forms of many shapes, and further shaping itself, we find a distinct cultural form “religion”. Religion for the human consciousness does not mean mere extension of the actively well-known experienced world of object, animal and man by cosmic powers reigning through the whole universe, and not merely the ordered life formations, rules, cults, etc., having the purpose to get a correct practical relation to these forces, to gain them for oneself, and the like. Rather religion means (in the specific sense) the higher step of mythical culture, in which these transcendent beings have been made absolute as divinities, the ascertainers of the absolute norms: which they have told men, made obvious, and in the observation of which men find their salvation. The development of the norm consciousness and development of religion are combined thereby and quite an explicit form of religion’s development and in a certain sense a highest one is characterized by its becoming a socially organized power of will, which wants to take into its discipline not only some separate life area (like one that is left to private freedom), but the whole community life corresponding to all its activities, that is, in such a way that it wishes to lead back each and everything under absolute divine norms, absolute divine demand and guidance.

This form of religious culture, by which the whole culture according to all cultural forms becomes a religious one, namely formed by religious norms, belongs to the oldest forms of highly developed culture; the old Babylonian culture lives in the practical idea of the *civitas dei*, has the form of the hierarchic state, in which according to the purpose all individual and social acts and orders, institutions have their absolute norms, derived from divine revelation, according to which they have been actually formed and thereby sanctified. Religion indeed is here as well the title for a cultural field that needs to be properly considered, namely as an ecclesiastical organization, as a system of cultural forms and objects, as order of the cult sites, etc., likewise as ongoing systematic formation of a theology, as methodical formation [61] of the dogmatic fixations and the creation of the belief system by thinking, towards the religious world interpretation, the establishment of ever new cultic rules, ever new religious norms for the creation of community life and the private life taking place in its forms. But it is a hierarchic culture’s peculiarity that simply religion is not merely a proper cultural field, but a shaping norm of all culture and of the whole life, and, considered in a concrete way, normal life and a religious one coincide. Ruler, regimen, right, custom, art – everything has a value content by religion and a value shape, and one, which is equipped in the ongoing development of this cultural type with ever richer normative bindings. We may also say that religion hides a universal system of all absolute acceptances here in the form of priestly theology, that is, in all relations, in cognition, in evaluation and practical order of life. It contains a universal world-view and universal order of salvation. And since it is supported by belief, going through the respective cultural humanity as a vivid belief, men do not feel subdued, subjected to all these bindings. Everything is simply as it should be, and as it may not be otherwise in order to be right. The world facts religion names as true are absolutely true, that, which religion names as good is absolutely good, that, which it demands for practical acting is absolutely demanded. It simply a divine demand. Grown into religious tradition, man lives every new revelation or every new priestly demand as absolutely justified, insofar as it simply proceeds through absolutely sanctified forms that have come down to us as absolutely justifying. There may not be any tension between authority and freedom, as little as there is a consciousness of illusion for the dreamer, it simply presupposes the awakening.

With regard to the life of community and the whole cultural development happening within, we may say though that it has the peculiar shape of a life, of a development, which includes a unitary final idea, a final idea objectively constituted within community consciousness, willingly guiding the development. Like a single man may carry a final idea beyond all single purposes, one, which is consciously reigning all possible single purposes and purpose actions, a conscious normal [62] form of the whole active life, thus something similar, as we see here, may also be the case for a communalized humanity, for one living within cultural forms and creating itself in one with them. It is an entelechy not in that improper sense, in which we assign it to every organism. We rightfully assign a goal of development in external regard and following experience to a normally growing organism; according to experience it grows towards a shape of maturity, that of its species. We also assign a goal of development to any arbitrary culture with regard to its continuous changes, where we, guided by an axiological perspective, observe an ongoing rise of value and a culmination within some shape of value: like speaking of some development within Greek art towards the height of Phidias. But it is quite different in the present case. A consciously constituted final idea and a useful will belonging to the whole community in a mediate way, and carried by its accompanying willing, lives within a cultural humanity and in the most conscious shape within one of its social organs (within priesthood). This final idea is that of a universal and absolute formation of the whole culture under the system of absolute norms, which need to be derived from divine revelation; or, which is the same, of the systematic shaping of the whole humanity life, striving, acting, and thereby the personal humanity itself, and of its surrounding world towards a “perfect” one, towards one corresponding to absolute norms.

This special form of a religious culture with the purpose idea of the *civitas dei* has other shapes of religious culture apart from it, in which religion is indeed a form communicating with others and even with all other cultural forms, but does not confront cultural development with a final idea, currently reigning this development and not reigning it in the way of a mere ideal, but in that of a unitary will going through community, of a priest will consciously reigning in the sense of this idea and correlatively to the layman’s will subordinating itself to religious dutifulness.

We thus have described a first type of culture implying a universally encompassing normative principle or system of principles for all theoretical and practical acceptance;

[63] a culture is not a manifoldness as such of community activities and community performances becoming solid in general types and combine to unities of developing cultural shapes, but a uniform norm guides all these shapings, imprints rule and law on them, and this norm is itself vivid in the community consciousness and itself as culture an objectivated norm historically developing, called “religion”.[[2]](#footnote-1)

<B. The shape of religious liberation movement>

A hierarchic culture as the Babylonian or the Jewish one has the character of a certain naivety despite its purpose consciousness and the character of unfreedom despite the volitional fulfilling with joy of belief of the religious prescriptions. Both lead to the same. The belief is an inherited belief, and as I said before, every new positing, nay, even every influx of a new revelation has its credit from new sources of power of the already inherited and from the adaptation of the new to the old. Freedom is an expression of the ability and especially of the acquired habit of a critical position taking towards that, which consciously shows itself, initially without any reflection, as true, as valuable, as practically supposed to be, that is, as a basis for the free deciding taking place from there. Thus it is better to relate freedom back to free deciding, to the essence of which it simply belongs to happen “due to” consideration, perfect freedom, pure freedom of a position taking, nothing of any force. General personal freedom in contrast to a single free decision. An expression for a habitual critical attitude towards everything, which shows itself straightforwardly as being accepted, for example as an absolute norm of acceptances. The ability to criticize belongs to man’s essence, he practices it in practical life, even if imperfectly, often enough, he “considers”, “reckons”, whether his purposes and means are actually real purposes and means, and without at the same time abandoning his prior convictions therefore, he questions them, by going over into the critical attitude [64], and thus inhibits the convictions’ effectiveness in the course of his criticizing, he considers in how far they deserve a credit. Every naturally conducted conviction may be treated in this way though, we may ask for its rightful reason, thus every conviction emerging with the claim for an absolute norm. Its claim must prove itself, the rightful reason itself for that, which the rightful reason claims to be for something else, wishes to be clarified. The religious belief itself needs to put up with the critique of its truth, of its right. The habit of free critique necessarily grows from a prior habit of naively performed theory and practical convictions, that is, necessarily in a community already religiously formed, in which all norms presenting themselves as absolute relate their rightful reason back to the belief, the rightful reason of which is out of the question, since the insurmountable subjective power of the mind prevent the questioning as a sacrilege against God.

Freedom now can develop in a double shape and gain importance as an extending liberation movement for the new formation of culture 1. in the shape of a religious movement for freedom, 2. in that of a development of free science and initially without any relation to the sphere of religious position takings, but then certainly within a culture, which has not forced fetters on cognition through religious binding.

The developmental conditions of the former are given within a nation, which has grown to the height of a fully developed hierarchic life regulation, namely if religion has stopped performing that, which of course it was called upon to perform for the people linked to the divine by the “revealed law”. If it does not any more guarantee national and included therein personal salvation contrary to its promises, the initially convincing explanation loses its power through the manifold sinful defecting from divine order, if after volitionally endured punishment and plenty of atonement the sorrow still increases, then the conditions are given for a freer statement on tradition and on the traditionalist externalization, which inevitably has emerged within historical development. The individual and the member of the people in need of salvation, investigates sense once more on its and its people’s relation to its God. The religious spiritualization of religious impressions, belonging to every normally proceeding cultural development may to a special degree become effective thereby as well; [65] the pure and true values and the normative types, intuitively distinguished in manifold concrete shapes within the community life proceeding and differentiating in a healthy way, will be projected into the religious. Thus an ever richer core of intuitively understandable contents of value, illuminated by some evidence full of light, grows within the total content of religion, clothed within an irrational factualness; intuitive insight and something irrational combine towards the unity of belief in an unseparated way. This rational core with its insightful normative necessity gains to an ever higher degree for the higher developing man the keynote within the content of belief and becomes the supportive force for the whole belief.

If now a free statement on religion grows towards a critical examination, which he, who is himself religiously rooted, performs at his and his people’s position towards God and his true demands, as we may understand it in Christ’s case, thus a crisis within religion happens by the intuitive contents of value being distinguished in most vivid intuition, in the religiously moved individual vividly proceeding in its direction from intuition to intuition, and creating a concept of God and a concept of divine demands to man and to God’s people, which is purely built from such an intuition, that is, from pure contents of value, and keeping the mere mythical frame of tradition as a remains of irrational factualness. The unitary intuition here receives the character of a unity of original religious experience, that is, of an originally lived relation to God, in which the subject of this intuition determines itself not as being addressed by an externally contrasting God, and as the carrier of a mediating revelation, but, as viewing him within itself, knows itself to be originally one with him, thus itself as embodiment of the divine light itself and thus as medium of the propagation of the divine being from some content of a divine being implemented in it. A reshaping of religion thus takes place here from the power of originally seen values and norms, which are seen into the world as a sense of salvation shaping them, and simply the evidence that such a world would actually make blissfully happy the one living in the belief, in the understanding apprehension of this sense, in the case that he simply actualizes the norm of the good within himself and thereby verifies its sense of salvation – simply this [66] evidence gives power to the belief itself and establishes <it>. The belief makes blissfully happy, and it is true, because he makes blissfully happy, because it documents sense within the activating of a sensible life in the world.

The understandable tendency of such a religious freeing from the power of the belief guided by pure viewing of value, implies that it transgresses the nationalist binding of the religious salvation and seriously tends towards a world religion. We need to note that the taking over of the Messianic revelation by others takes place in the way of free conversion, not in external taking over of messages, but in the following understanding of the original experiences of the founder, that is, in the following experiencing of his intuitions, and thereby the original power of intuitive values and the corresponding whole motivation works here in the understanding following empathizing again, just that the relation to God is not effected immediately, but by the mediator and his propagations taken from inside: And thus it was the sense of the new religion as such, by which it presented a new religious type, that it should not be a religion from some irrational tradition, but from the (in a certain good sense rational) sources of original religious experience. Because the one who is born into and educated into religion should also gain his personal relation to Christ and through him to God from an original religious intuition; he should take an inward free position within an actual creating of religious intuition through the surviving message of salvation due to him, through the narrations of Christ’s life, of his parables, self-testimonies, etc., feel one with God and search for the access to God’s realm following the norm he has appreciated in the Christian life.[[3]](#footnote-2)

Christ’s message of salvation originally is oriented towards the individuals in need of salvation and not towards the Jewish state’s nation. Understandably so. Because the religious statement drawing on the original norm intuition initially relates to the individual and a reversal of his personality, a radical new formation of his individual life dispositions; a respective valuable rebuilding of the societal orders presupposes men of the new disposition and naturally took second place in the interest. [67] Religion (or rather religious community and a newly developing church) thus is separated from all of the other cultural life; it forms its own cultural content within the total culture, a realm of proper personal life connecting people in contrast to the complete other societal and stately life. As soon as the new movement though, that of the free religion, victoriously spreads over the old world, and the consciousness of its vocation to be a world religion takes on the form of secure hope, also the task of a concrete shaping of the whole culture life with all its stately orders must step into view in the sense of a Christian world view, and take on the power of an entelechy reigning the development of the culture’s humanity. The new church must <try> to gain influence on the existing states and especially on the Roman Empire, and itself needs to take over the idea of the world spanning empire, the sense of a church reigning the world – reigning the world in the complete sense and not only in the sense of a power determining and ruling certain convictions of all men. Thus the way towards a hierarchical church has been shown to the newly developing church and the vocation to establish a hierarchical world state has been shown, a *civitas dei*, in which all social activities of men, all societal orders and institutions, all cultural performances, are normalized in a religious way. The new thing in this new hierarchical idea does not so much consist in the spanning the world (which should not have been foreign to old hierarchies as the Babylonian one), but in that religion, being the system of normalizing convictions, knows itself as a religion taken from original religious intuitions, from free intuitively-rational position taking, as a religion from free, rational belief, and not from blind tradition.

This development actually takes place, but crosses with that other movement for freedom presented above, which has its sources not in the belief, but in knowledge, more precisely in the development of that, which we now call philosophy and science as such. We know quite well from our own studies *in concreto* what this means. If we insert a deeper characteristic as well and similarly that of which is peculiar to that freeing, which only happens through it and which eventually takes on the distinct form of a [68] liberation movement under the guidance of a consciously guiding purpose idea. The most general following the known shall be briefly stated and it is understandable enough. Free philosophy and science as a function of autonomous theoretical reason develops in the Greek nation and determines in proceeding movement the development of a general mind of free cultural life from autonomous reason, extending beyond this nation in a victorious way and creating unity of a Hellenic culture and thereby the specifically European. But let us now follow the development of Christian movement and the formation of the specifically medieval cultural shape.

<C. The medieval religious shape of culture>[[4]](#footnote-3)

By the meeting of those cultural movements differentiated above, the extension over the world of the Greek, scientifically formed culture and the extension over the world of the Christian religion, and by the sympathetic linking of the intuitive rationality of the belief and rationality of philosophy and science, or, as we could also say, the freedom of the Christian and the freedom of the philosopher, becoming conscious of their inner kinship, the “Middle Ages” grow. The religion, this is part of its essence, cannot acknowledge the autonomy of scientific thinking being independent of the belief, it must interpret all norm of acceptance in a religious way and set limits to its freedom at the same time in the taking over of free science through the dogmatically stable norm that is taken from religious intuition. On the other hand it cannot do without the thinking formation of the intuitive contents, it needs a theology, like any higher developed religion, like the Babylonian already wanted and had, as a science, which had the task to determine the content of belief in an objectively thinking way, to develop it according to the encompassed consequences and to research the works of the divine within the world and man’s conditions resulting from that. Added to this for Christian theology there was – and rather was the one determining at first – the purpose of apologetic [69] against the attacks of non-Christian philosophy, which had to be denied, if the philosophically educated world should be gained. The Christian theology does not only have the peculiarity against the older traditions belonging to other cultural circles, which has grown to it from Christian freedom (of religious position taking from sources of intuitive rationality), but most of all that it has acquired philosophy born from the spirit of theoretical freedom according to methods and goals, although equipped it with a new mind of norm and afterwards changed it essentially. It even took over the norms cognized in purely theoretical insight for every theoretically (and then free) cognition full of insight. On the other hand it took over the goal of a universal theoretical world cognition, which was supposed to necessarily grow to a theoretical interest, which freely works, and at the same time the goal of a universal technology growing as well, of a theoretical research of the practical norms, according to which man should rationally order his life on the basis of his cognition of the world and of man himself, and rationally reign and usefully reform his surrounding world. It was the belief’s essence to span the whole world as well in its way, the world as a fact and the practical world, with all its regulating norms. However the interest initially was exclusively directed towards the care and effect of original intuition in itself and in others, that of the original belief, however it was aligned to the unification with Christ to be performed thereby and through him with God as well as the promises of eternal bliss in a transcendent world – the expanding Christianity was forced to get along with this world and a religious rational shape needed to be demanded for the life of a Christianized community in each and everything. Furthermore, the actual content and ordered course of nature, of the whole universe as being created by God, was supposed to be included in the unity of religious rationality. The natural human functions and especially the natural human reason as well could not be excluded, that is, which he presented as a natural right and good, and which even was named by him the principle of absolute acceptance, needed to be traced back to God as the source of all norm, in a subjective regard to the belief as the absolute source of cognition, in which we grasp God. Philosophy thus, the science of the Greeks, the [70] creation by natural reason, is taken over, eagerly performed, religiously interpreted according to its supernatural sources of acceptance and at the same time normalized, limited through the belief’s content. This is itself taken in philosophical concepts, and scientified, but then it forms a barrier for free scientific research simply as an objectively stabilized norm of belief. Theology in its consequence always becomes a universal science (as Greek philosophy according to its intention), and all science, natural science as well, quite late acquiring an independent interest, has its theological index. Natural scientific cognition is a function of religion as any cognition as such and has freedom only in the form of religious freedom, that is, from the belief. And likewise all practice becomes a function of religion according to the idea, it must be a theoretical, theologically guided practice. This development lends its characteristic shape to medieval culture in the frame of the complete European culture and of all former cultures at the same time. We do not have in view these certainly right features of medieval culture, which are distinct and all known: in such a way that the process of dogmatizing, of theological absolutizing philosophical explanations of original intuitive contents, creates some traditionalism not only inhibiting the freedom to rationally interpret according to new philosophical insights, but also deviates the believer’s religious life from the original intuitive sources, nay, always cuts it ff and gives him the satisfaction of external correctness of belief with the acceptance of not understood formulae instead of bliss. I do neither wish to speak of the other traditionalism of the medieval church and theological science. That, which we are interested in here, is rather the enormous momentum of medieval cultural development still not suffering over the centuries in such an externalization, and the central idea, which lends this momentum to medieval life.

The medieval “occident” means a unity of hierarchic culture, although it fails to not only combine it to an ecclesiastical unit, but also politically to a state unity, and in a still higher sense, richer differentiated inwardly than in the old hierarchic cultures, it is a [71] culture, which implies a consciously guiding final idea, a final idea, which is thus actually conceived in occidental community consciousness and actually motivates the development – similar to a conscious practical purpose within a single subject. The medieval occident at first has a mental power in the church grasping beyond all single states and intruding everywhere into the life of the people communities consisting of single states, a transnational, imperialistically organized community of priests, creating a transnational community consciousness between the nations, and which is everywhere accepted in the same way as carrier of divine authority and as an appointed organ to spiritually guide humanity. In this special community though, in the church, the idea of the *civitas dei* though is the consciously reigning final idea, and it is this mediately for the whole religiously communalized occident. The goal of a political empire, in which the church is the proper power, or at first the goal to become that power in all states, which brings it closer to the ideal of the *civitas dei*, to prepare everything in the service of this Christianization of the whole culture, and also to create a universal theory, as a theoretical and also universal theology, as a theoretical and practical universal science, above all to research the social, the political life scientifically and according to its true normative forms in the service of this idea, these are purposes essentially determining the vividness of the medieval movement of the mind. These are not empty ideals, but purposes, in the attainability of which you belief in the course of time and towards which you joyfully work as a religious mission.

This is thus the form, in which the European humanity organizes as a rational humanity under a rational idea in the Middle Ages and attempts to lead a community life determined by purpose.

It is known that there is no lack of inner tensions and starting points for counter movements, which are based on the structure of the medieval mind, that is, tensions between dogmatized belief, exteriorizing traditionalism of a different shape and original institution of belief, the latter trying to struggle for its right in the movements of mystic; On the other hand the tension between “belief” and “knowledge”, that is, between the essentially different types of belief of the original and the traditionalized belief and the natural [72] evidence and science.

This culture’s disintegration has emerged from these tensions, essentially determining the course of medieval culture. Its entelechy, in which we see its peculiar sense, the sense of the “Middle Ages”, loses its force and stops being the development’s main force of drive; like the status of clergymen and church, although it keeps vivid its international imperialistic organization and even this idea as an ideal at least in itself, lose the authoritative position in the peoples’ general consciousness. The ecclesiastically religious culture sinks to become a branch of the general culture next to free science, next to the art, etc. A new religious movement starts with an elementary force, the movement for reformation, which partially enforces the religious institution’s original right against the church, which has become historical, and takes a stand for the original “freedom of the Christian”. It does not relate to any new revelation, it does not present itself with a new Messiah, it only restores the sources of original tradition, which are still vividly working, in order to create from them a vivid relationship to Christ and to the original Christian community through original religious experience. But, as is well known, the reformation not necessarily gains and gains lastingly acceptance and it fizzles out in a new church, which, however enormously the ideas of reformation work, still is unable to instill a new final idea into modern times.

It is quite a different matter with the other movement for freedom against the bound medieval “spirit”, and against its idea of an ecclesiastical empire, the movement for the freedom of philosophy’s and science’s natural reason. It has a secondary character as well, like the movement for reformation. That, which it reforms or restores, is the science, it denies the medieval science as an unfree theology (or a theologically turned science), it returns to the idea of philosophy in the ancient sense as a science determined not by the belief, in which form ever, not by motives of the mood, by the necessity for salvation deriving from human life’s urge, but to that of a purely objective one, determined by purely objective motives, a function of the purely theoretical interest.

<II The step of scientific culture>

<A. The shape of the philosophical movement to freedom. The essence of true science>

But it is now time to perform the supplementing cultural analysis and to mark the peculiar of the liberation movement beginning in the Greek nation and being performed in it on a main stretch, in the form of creating a new cultural form, philosophy. Therefore we need to determine the specifically peculiar of the European culture and to prove that this does not only have its morphological peculiarities like a matter of course, as any other culture unitarily distinguishing itself in humanity, but that it has a form, and above all morphological peculiarities of its cultural history, distinguishing it. And what is more, or more closely determined, humanity living in it and this life itself have a special form axiologically to be valued in the highest way, with which this humanity climbs the highest step demanded for it as humanity as such, the step of a cultural humanity shaping itself and its surrounding world from purely autonomous reason and more closely from scientific reason.

This does not mean anything less than that we ascribe not only the relatively highest rank among all historical cultures to the European culture, whose type of development we have described by that, simply by its having actualized it, but that we see the first actualization of an absolute norm of development in it, which is called to revolutionize every other developing culture. Because each developing humanity, living in the unity of a culture, is subject to the categorical imperative. And each shall and must stand up to the consciousness of this imperative and according to it willingly strive for a new form of development according to it.

If we take the concept science and the originally coinciding concept philosophy in the strict sense, then the ancient Greeks are the creators of philosophy or rather science. That, which the ancient Babylonians, Egyptians, Chinese and even Indians call with the same words, may contain some cognition [74] verifying a strict science, taking over its content, may take over in their methodical way and attitude, but we have a reason to make a radical cut between both, and we possibly call the same cognition and self-reasonings on the one hand pre-scientific or un-scientific, on the other scientific ones.

In order to clarify this, we first of all differ between a most general and a more determined concept of cognizing and then in this again between a non-scientific and a scientific one.

Cognizing is an act in the widest sense, a mental doing (an *ego cogito*) of any Ego, which indeed has the act’s shape of a “belief”, which, proceeding and amounting to a complex building, results in a terminating belief. That, which is called belief here, is also called judging in a widest sense by some, and we differ the “conviction” (judgment in a second sense) newly instituted together with him, or, if it had already been instituted within the judging subject renewing in an actualizing way – the habitual conviction he owns, even if he sleeps, as such, if the act has gone by and is itself not retentional any more. The judging or believing has its What, its content in that it is something or is not anything, that it is thus, that it is related to this or that in these and those relations, etc. And this judged What, the identical sense, which may be identically common to multiple judgment acts, is the judgment (as the meaning of a judgment, judgment in the third sense). Every perceiving or remembering in this widest sense now, insofar as it supposes to apprehend something being, “posits” an object as being, is a judging. The judging has manifold changes essentially belonging to it, the belief in being can “modalize”, go over into some supposing-to-be-possible, reckoning (supposing-to-be-probable), a doubt, a negation, which are also called modes of the judging. Judging can take on the practical form of some judging striving and of some freely active volition, that is, in such a way that this is directed towards a distinct form of the judgment (the judged as such), and this distinct form is that of the “truth” – and initially of the secure certainty.

A judgment may already be given as judgment of the normal form of certainty [75], but go over into uncertainty, it may become questionable, doubtful whether it is thus. Or an “option” emerges in advance, a supposition that it was thus, and the wish is aroused, whether it is or it is not this way, to “decide” – through a verifying or denying certainty of judgment: This happens by way of “establishment”, through motives of a judgment, which lend certainty to the supposed option, simply by its force of motivation, and in a verbal fixing this reads as follows: “This is certainly thus, due to these and those reasons”, also: “It is thus in truth”. The judgingly striving, and in the widest sense thus cognizing man mostly lives within the moment, and for the moment he is interested in a decision, whether he has reason to utter it or not. He is not interested though in deciding the question “once and for all” and to fix the decision once and for all, possibly with that establishment, establishing “once and for all”. You then recur to motives, reasons, which are absolutely certain. The “absolute certainty” is not a statement by the subject, in which it supports some case as a lasting personality, the kind of certainty does not imply the character of the διἀθεσις’ absoluteness, the “I am thus and as I am, it is decided thus: I, as this one, I cannot act otherwise”. Indeed the establishments renewed in the revivification of verbal fixings have an ever equal force, if they do not have any rooted and again performed convictions as motives, and man thus appreciates, himself sure of this fact, where the certainty of decision more often needs to be practically important, to make himself sure of the established certainty and its establishment, which possibly has been acquired in a tiresome way, which may be added by the motive that he may also then use the establishment against others to convince them, or that they as well may appreciate this certainty, etc. An established judgment and its establishment thus take on the character of an available possession and good for the single individual, but also for the community. A general interest of which source ever may lead to one’s striving to gain certainties, “truths” for a general object field, on nature, on the course of the stars, on divine and human things, and then the ordered succession, making an ordered epistemic field from the area of cognition by systematic contexts of establishment. [76] “Science” thus grows as a system of common goods and through systemizing as a unitary common good – in an improper, lax sense. The intersubjective stability, objectivity of such a science is based on its establishments not resting on individually changing objective or mood motives, but on generally firmly rooted convictions, coming from ancient worked out traditions. Especially mythological and religious motives have a determining and also general force here (in the respective cultural circle). But cognition reigned by such motives and a science, which has grown in such a way, e.g. a theological one (as the Babylonian astronomy as astrology), is not a genuine and pure science. We gain a second concept of science, if we let emerge the difference between a judgment, which is “completely certain”, or which we, insofar as we realize it in its complete sense, are individually or in community “absolutely certain” of, furthermore establishments of judgments, acquiring such absolute certainty through establishments, which as the final ones point back to such certainties being once and for all firm; and on the other hand judgments, which are “evident”, sentences saying what we gain in exactly that sense, in which it is said, from original givennesses of the things and objective contexts themselves, the objects they are talking about, by experiencing them in bodily selfness and by seeing in an experiencing way that they are actually thus, the conditions to bring the objects given themselves actually into a unity of viewing a relation, and seeing that indeed a relation takes place, or establishments instituting certain convictions by their normalizing and verifying a lasting certainty through measuring against the self-givenness, or that they transfer in insightful “conclusions” from sentences being normalized in an immediately insightful way towards the certain judgment which is now mediately motivated with insight. That, which motivates is insightful in all steps and insightful in view of the true being, of the true result, or rather, of the true reason. True cognition is the fulfilling of some striving not towards certainty as such, but certainty from self-given truth motivated with insight.

The motivations or establishments and judgments with insight take place here as normalizations of the judgment opinions through [77] measuring against the objectivities “themselves”, the true in the first sense. Namely, the objective, the meant in judging, the “self-given” in the judging is originally there in the insight, actualized, the subject is at the thing itself, has it itself in its judging viewing, insight. In the passage from a judging opinion without insight towards the insight, the normalizing identification of the meant and self-given emerges, and the opinion gets the character of an existing actuality, of the “Yes, it is actually this way”, of the justice of norms, of the truth in the second sense. Objectively motivated judgments are objectively accepted, that is, intersubjectively common acceptances, insofar, as that, which I see, can be seen by everyone; The common features, the title of which is the common objective world, which is constituted in exchangeable experiences, stand above all differences of the individuals, the nations, the generally accepted and firmly rooted traditions, so that all may communicate with all, may recur to the same seen. And a realm of the truth opens up, at first related to that and then going beyond, which everyone may bring into his view, which everyone may actualize in a seeing way within himself, everyone from every cultural circle, friend and enemy, Greek or barbarian, child of God’s people or God of enemy peoples. That is at first emerging from the common communication in a matter of course, at least for the circle of the general real surrounding world. Judgments on experiential facts of course have their norm at the experienced things themselves, that the sun had risen, that it is raining, and the like. This has its certainty and truth, for which you may not relate to any religion, to nothing else but simply to the experienced objects. But everyone judges simply beyond this next sphere of experience, and motives from experience and objective insight as such mix with low-order motives on the lower step, where objective certainties are fixed, with those, which are so deeply rooted in personality that even their doubting threats to “deroot” them, which it thinks it cannot relinquish without giving itself up, which may lead to enormous reactions of the mood. But it is often the unseparated mixture making the force, namely insofar as the true force comes from the normalization through insight. Exactly critique belongs to the highest step, the conscious differentiation between the “heteronomous” and autonomous motives of certainty [78] and the position of the cognizing subject against all motivations of the mood for a judging certainty (to which also belong the probabilities to be changed into certainties, etc., that is, certainty for a probable being instead of a being as such), and against other motivation through “prejudice”, than convictions normalized by no insight. The judgment must be true, that is, objective (through measuring against the “thing itself” as to be seen originally), no matter, whether I, or my comrades like it or not, whether it hits me and us all “at the root”: The root does not need to be suitable. The thought is not a right one, because I, the way I am, and we, the way we are, have to think in such a way, but only if it is the right one, then our thinking itself proves to be right, and we ourselves as the right subjects of cognition, those who firmly carry the “in itself” right direction of judgment in themselves. This also characterizes the so-called “theoretical interest”, the “purely theoretical attitude”, belonging to the right cognition. It is the “purely objective” interest, that in the thing itself, the way it is; but according to the properly guiding opinion the same is said by: which is exclusively directed towards certainties true to the norm, convictions and statements, which may any time show their being true to the norms in an establishment that is true to the norm (in many steps, true to the norm themselves). They have only then the *adaequatio* to the “*res*”, which simply “live” in the mode of the original self-givenness of the insightful action. There, where this contrasting and the conscious will to truth as being true to the norm are not present in this sense, there the cognitions and establishments cannot be quite correct, that is, demonstrable in the true cognition attitude, but they are therefore often true cognition for the one who has formed them in a naïve way. If we consider the theoretical interest, or rather, the theoretical attitude not limited to single cases and single persons, if we rather consider that the joy of such a true cognition becomes a universal purpose in the human life, a “vocation”, then true science grows and, in the case of full universality with regard to the sphere of cognition, encompassing the universe of the theoretical cognizable as such, philosophy. Thereto the theoretical interest strives on its own accord; if namely joy of the true cognition as such has become life determining, then it is seen shortly after that every answer leaves open questions [79] or opens up new questions, that no object is completely isolated, it has parts, contexts, dependencies, which were not encompassed in the limited question, or could not have been done in the answer, and thus the cognition proceeds in the “objective context”, which becomes conscious in the connection of experiences and insights within the connections of establishment as determining itself as insightful and as always being enlarged through new insights.

<B. The formation of the philosophical shape of culture in Greece. The two steps of true science>

But two steps of true science need to be distinguished now, a prior step and a step of the actually constituted science, entered into the course of development, into the trail of cognition proceeding in a way true to the norm. The theoretical interest is indeed exclusively determining on the prior step, and the critical defense of prejudices is being performed, but the first, completely naïve considering the world, is accompanied by some quite incomplete evidence, and does not establish any objective certainty, let alone actually an objectively accepted science. I say, [considering] the world. Because that, which first arouses the theoretical interest is not the circle of experience, in which the daily acting and working proceeds. This concrete practice does not have any need for a science yet. Only science, which has developed, and shows itself to be technically fruitful, arouses a scientific need from practice. The concrete experience guides the practice, and the concrete practical need determines, which new and special ways concrete experience has to take. Everything is well known here, also the way to gain useful knowledge. The theoretical interest thus transcends this circle and first begins as a waking-up of a geographical interest in a foreign landscape, in foreign peoples and habits, political institutions, religious beliefs, etc. This promotes the sober objective beliefs as well though, of an endlessly far reaching human and objective world, whereby the treasures of the experiential cognitions on nature arouse interest as well, which have been gathered by foreign peoples through regular observing [80] experience, even if from religious motives and with religious apperceptions. These religious dressings up are already without any effect for the globetrotter with a theoretical attitude, because the respective religious convictions are distant to him. The mysterious universe and its general “principles” from such motives becomes the highest and universally encompassing theme of theoretical considering in Greece. The intention is directed at gaining general thoughts, which could make this mysterious universe understandable in its infinity and unacquaintedness: objectively understandable, insofar as these were general thoughts of an understandable truth, through which an explaining light could fall on every concrete single thing.

But these insights of the first “philosophers” had no force enabling, let alone unconditionally causing any objective certainty. They operated with rough analogies in this stadium of first naivety, with transferences of eidetic ways of imagination and of rules of experience of the daily sphere of experience to cosmic dimensions. Although every analogous interpretation being linked to experience has its evidence, that is, to some degree the force of objective motivation, there are still different steps of evidence and those of quite small force. Different interpretations of such a kind could struggle with each other (even direct experience and inductions directly taken from it can struggle, but certainly become reconciled through enlarged and more concise experience). Each of the newer philosophies has indeed provided for univocality of their general thoughts and of the more concrete explanations taken from them, but the freedom of a theoretical statement, which the purely objective attitude has given to every new researcher, enabled a new one for every new one on this step, and thus many philosophies being incompatible with one another. This fact eventually motivated the waking up of some skepticism, which <doubted> the option of something like a “philosophy”, of objective truth and science, ascertainable by everyone in objective insight as being unconditionally accepted in general. This lent the healthy turn towards cognition of the *unum necessarium* under such circumstances to the thinking. It could wake up and has woken up the great cognition in Socrates and perfectly in Plato that naïve philosophy, cognition having an impact on naively activating [81] the theoretical interest, does not already enable true philosophy, no system of objective acceptances, which everyone with a purely objective attitude and thinking needed to accept as being necessarily mandatory for him. Philosophy is only possible with a prior critical consideration of the general conditions of the option of objectively accepted cognition as such; the sense of such a cognition, the relation between cognizing and the cognized must be exposed in complete clarification, of judgment and truth, of that through the measuring of a judging meaning of a contingently gained conviction against the self-given case, the essence of mediate establishment, and the essential norms and methods belonging to it.

In other words, true science cannot begin without further ado, it is only possible through “logical”, “epistemic” consideration and properly only possible if some logic has been justified as a central science by the method, as a general scientific doctrine. This first of all sciences is necessarily related back to itself. If it succeeded in first regard, then a reflection farther reaching back must result in the insight that its own experiencing is according to the norms it has set itself. This is the course of development necessary in itself and at the same time historical. Proper philosophy and science begin after the naïve philosophy of the period of the prior steps with the Socratic and Platonic reflections on the method, and the Platonic “dialectic” is the first and the basis of the science’s science of the essence, a scientific doctrine, and from there a logic as discipline of the method of true cognition and science belongs to every following philosophy.

Indeed, this relating back of philosophy and all special science branching off towards logical critique – and in the ideal towards a universal and complete logic – fundamentally changes the character of science. Science, the thinking in the motivation of a purely theoretical interest, principally loses its naivety of cognition and it is part of its essence that this loss of naivety also finds its expression within true science in the form of consciousness, in which the cognizing takes place. Cognitive actions are only scientific, if they have not only been declared by some external critic [82] as being proved, according to logical norms, but if they are carried indeed and in every single step by the reflective consciousness of being true to the norm. The scientist himself must have actually convinced himself of this being true to the norm in every step, he must have examined in a reflective way every naively experienced evidence and (if logic has accordingly proceeded) have determined the scope of this evidence in principle, by recurring to the type of evidence and normal law. He must not use any sentence as a precondition, which he has not established himself, he may not perform any mediate establishment, without his having the normalizing concluding law at hand for every step of the conclusion. And he is responsible for all that himself and all alone, it is only his own insight giving him the right to stand for his cognition as cognition. However some workmanlike experiencing may be mechanized here, and however mechanizing becomes necessary for the scientific progress here as well, still the habitual consciousness for norms accompanying this needs to be there in all return of similar steps of cognition already justified according to their normal principle, that, which has sprung from a former justification with insight, shows the practical security to be able to actually demonstrate the rightful acceptance, that is, to advocate it against everyone. Scientific cognition can only thereby become a common good, can that, which has once been discovered as “objective” for everyone, as something, which everyone can have an insight into and take over as the same with the help of the insight. The same becomes possible especially by its becoming the methodical principle of science itself, to not only make the justified cognitions, but also the justification itself an objective expression. Nay, only then its expression becomes actually objective as a cognition, if the expression of the justifications is appropriately complete, only built up of immediately understandable elements, enabling everyone to bring to actual insight the whole unity of establishment and to make sure of its being true to the norm. But then everyone following in understanding is in the same situation as the original discoverer in the state of the completely acquired insight, and that, which this one has acquired, does he not have acquired for himself alone, but for everyone, insofar as everyone now has the same acquisition merely following in understanding.

We need to pay attention here to the fact that we have described the essence of science in the sense of a sound idea. But however far [83] the following Greek and modern science will lack behind this idea: this idea is implanted into it as an effective idea, and it asserts the claim to be true science within itself only thus far and only in such theories, as it believes to have already actualized this ideal. It is a matter for itself that it may be mistaken in that and that it lacks far behind this idea on every step, even there, where it does not notice it, because the de facto methodical reflection, that of the scientific doctrine, had not grown far enough, and because later some kind of technization of the scientific method obstructs deeper insight itself, and this shall be treated later. It is in any case the basic character of the developing true science to consciously shape itself according to this ideal and to consistently present the type of a science, normalizing reflectively through methodical reflection with insight, a logical one. It is the infinite glory of the Greek nation, to not only have founded a philosophy as such as a cultural shape of a purely theoretical interest, but to have performed through its double star Socrates – Plato the unique creation of the idea of logical science and of a logic as universal scientific doctrine, as a normalizing central science of the science as such. The concept of logos as autonomous reason and initially theoretical reason, as the ability of a “selfless” judging, which as a judging from pure insight exclusively listens to the voices of the things “themselves”, thereby gets its original concept and at the same time its force creating the world anew. And no less the idea of logic, of the science of reason as “organon” for all true science.

You may say though that not only the theoretical interest gets independent in the Greek people, and establishes an autonomous culture of theoretical reason, but that the same holds true also for the aesthetical interest and its art, and that its whole culture life has the general character of freedom in all directions, which are determined by the different kinds of acts, to which simply different kinds of reason are assigned. But whereas this is in contrast to other cultures only a matter of degree (we find for example works of a free aesthetical art outside of Greece as well), it is a culture of cognition of a new style with regard to the “strict” science [84] and on top of that a culture, which was determined to lift humanity as such with regard to its whole life and working on a new step. It is the Greeks, who have implanted a general new kind of form idea into the European culture in consequence of the philosophy’s creation in its pregnant (Platonic) sense, whereby it took on the general form character of a rational culture from scientific rationality or a philosophical culture. Of course this is to be understood *cum grano salis*, it is a proceeding formation, which has been put into work, and, as we will hear, the ideal of the philosophical shaping of culture entering general consciousness later – in modern times – changes itself into a true final idea, which as a universal will to culture determines the basic character of modern times, as long as it is in freely rising development (period of enlightenment).

We consider the following in order to make this clear: The origin of Greek science lies in single men being moved by the interest, which we call the purely theoretical one, by pure love to objective cognition, to the truth given with insight. The permanent fixing of the acquired truth and its establishment in literary form do not only have the purpose for the cognizing subject itself to be able to actualize them any time with insight, to enjoy it again, but it is also available for it as a helpful premise for the establishment of new truths. Acquired truth thus becomes a lasting possession and good. This fixing at the same time serves the mediation to others, whose interest in cognition is thereby aroused, and who now receive the same insights and joys. The message does not limit the proper free disposal and the joy of cognition, on the contrary, the mental good is soon a common good, the joy is a common joy, that is, a double joy; and every utilization for the development of cognition becomes soon a gain for the communicating subject as well. This understandable fact is thus a constant motive for the literary statement, and it institutes at the same time men’s community of interest, which, because it has its substrate in the community of ideal values identically to be dedicated to all, that is, superindividual values, knows no conflicts of interest – as long as egotistical interest does not intervene and darken the purity of the “philosophical” striving [85]. The scientific community thereby naturally enlarging, and the mental possession of the community continuously enlarging within, the “philosophy”, create new and even higher values beyond the values of cognition, which are founded in the value of science itself. These are “ethical”, personal values, individual [values] and values of the community, which grow. Because for the sake of pure pleasure, which the individual has for the purely mental values and their creation, he acquires a personal value for himself, that of the philosopher, of the one “loving wisdom”, and with regard to the sympathetic joy, every like-minded shows, he is also of value for the other one. Everyone becomes aware of the personal value in the other one, which has grown to him through the continued turning of his life towards the mental range of values. And what is more: Everybody learns to feel a part of an open and continuously growing community of philosophers and feels the joy in the beauty of such a community and in the value of one through the common relation to a growing realm of mental values, which all have not only joy in, but all work together for. Everyone feels the joy in the growing value, which every individual receives in it and through it, and everyone learns to find his own demand and his own luck in demanding that, which makes the other ones lucky and raises them. Such motives do constantly and involuntarily work and even show their force after the turn of pure love for wisdom into egotistic thirst for glory and scientific greed have emerged and those egotistic changes of motives, which grow from the practical usefulness of science.

Science, philosophy thereby is at first, even if not for a long time a “not practical“ thing, a pure formation of intersubjectively communalized theoretic interest, an objective realm of goods, the extratheoretical usefulness of which is not questioned and which originally in any case does not give any motives for the estimating and creating of such values. Indeed the cosmological problems and theories at first reigning the interest in their manifold generalness and primitive vagueness moved in abstractive heights, leaving far behind all areas of human practice and thereby kept away every thought of a possible practical exploitation.

Meanwhile, if the cognition had once tested its force in purely theoretical attitude [86] within a wide sphere of cognition and led to impressive theories, then it could not fail to take possession of other spheres of cognition as well. Wherever cognitions were already at hand or the action of cognition entered the game for what motives ever, the new habit of “philosophical” thinking was bound to ascertain its being superior. The realm of human practice and practical reason above all could thus be included into philosophical work. The philosophical turning towards the practice, that is, its inclusion into the theoretical interest marks in historical relation the most important point of philosophical development, insofar as through this turn alone the justification of logic and of logically normalized philosophy had been motivated; but not only that, also the establishment of a universal philosophy spanning being and the should-be, facts and norms, had its starting point there as well as the creation of the idea of a philosophical, truly human man’s life as of a life from philosophical reason. The sophistic had searched for its evidence for paradox formation of its skeptical theories, which wanted to establish in the shape of philosophical theories that no philosophical theory could in truth be accepted, in conflict with the cosmological philosophies. This theoretical conflict though had a practical purpose. Because the sophistic had an essentially practical attitude. The philosophy does not give any truth, but its forms of concept and argumentation are quite useful arts for the political rhetoric. But the opinion that a truly reasonable life practice was to be established by a theoretical consideration of reason (that is, in the passage into a purely theoretical attitude and for example even into a theoretical philosophy formed in advance) is not the basis of the direction towards the practically useful. They indeed denied the option of an objectively valid cognition and science. The meaning of the Socratic reaction against the skepticism is now especially that neither he wants to be a theoretical philosopher, but a pragmatist, insofar as not theoretical cognition, but a reasonable conduct of life is the first to him; but that he considers to be possible a reasonable and therefore truly satisfying human life only as a philosophical one. Spoken in a more distinct way: Only he who considers his life and the purposes moving it in a philosophical way – going over into purely theoretical attitude - [87] only he who gains insight in this attitude as to what is truly beautiful and not beautiful, noble or low, just or unjust, good or bad, and thus cognizes the true norms of practical reason in a philosophizing way, may actually put his life into the game as a practical one by being consciously guided by them. This implied, there is a philosophy in truth, that is, a philosophy of the reasonable life practice, included in it a philosophy of values. But philosophy is a function of the reasonable practice, it is the organ, bringing to its cognition the true goals. Acting follows true knowledge. The true knowledge, that is: Only he, who has worked out the complete clarity of the norm on his own accord in proper theoretical work of reason, has that genuine knowledge actually motivating the will.

This turn of course at first implies the core for developing some ethics, but also the core for the transference of the free sense investigation rising above naïve acting and initially inhibiting it, towards the philosopher’s naïve acting, that is, towards the uncritically naïve theoretic doing within philosophy itself. The true cognizing acting, the true philosophizing needs some sense investigation, which only searches the fundamental goals of philosophizing within the ethical sense investigation of the highest self-responsibility, and therefore explores the possible methods: That is the sense of the Platonic turn towards logic and thereby towards philosophy as a strict science. The germ for some further development is at the same time implied in the Socratic and Platonic turn. The relation of all acting, of the concretely full human life towards the fundamental ethical norms (taken in one: the categorical imperative) is not sufficient. Not only a formal ethical doctrine of principles is needed, but a universally encompassing theoretical science, exploring the whole realm of the theoretically cognizable, unfolds it in a systematically combined manifoldness of single sciences, namely it is needed under the guiding idea of a reasonable life to be concretely performed, and being as perfect as possible, of a humanity, which is as perfect as possible and lives in a way, which is as satisfied as possible. Social ethics, the preferably concrete exertion of which only enables the concrete normalization of every individual doing, is needed above all beyond mere individual ethics as a formal doctrine of principles of the single human life of reason. [88] But the deeper consideration on what the reasonable human life, being *eo ipso* a social one, needs for a proceeding heightening and perfection, within the generally normative form, which prescribes the formal idea of reason, leads to the necessity of a universal philosophy.

As to the idea of a social ethics first, this is, more clearly spoken the normative sciences of the communalized humanity as of a humanity shaping its whole life according to behavior norms. It arrives at a first, still imperfect and yet already forceful break through in the Platonic “State”. Because it is the natural consequence of his design of an ideal state that there was an absolute norm of reason not only for some polis, but for the whole humanity being in the unity of community relations creating culture, that it has to organize itself towards a humanity guided by autonomous reason and the reason in the objectivated form of true universal philosophy, if it shall become a true and genuine humanity. But as a man, thus is humanity only able to guide itself, and like a man can only become a true man by his consciously creating the normative idea of this genuineness and the idea of a normal life and subjects it voluntarily to this idea as a categorical imperative, likewise can humanity only become a reasonable one, if it is guided by the idea of some humanity creating its whole personal life according to the norms in the general consciousness, and consciously works out for itself the determined content of these norms. It is the question how this working practical purpose idea was supposed to become historically possible and indeed has become possible that this idea rooted in the open endless European humanity.

But now at first a shape of the effectiveness of this idea of reason is not only there as a historical fact, that is, based on the already constituted philosophy, but also most easily understandable. Although the Greeks were not able to adequately realize the idea of a philosophical science (of a universally encompassing science, which is absolutely justified by logical formation), insofar as philosophy indeed was the title for a multitude of interfering philosophies, thus do its large impressive systems not only gain as such, but according [89] to the whole idea they represent a predominant force in the Greek cultural life. Every philosophy draws the picture of the genuine man as of the philosopher, namely as of the man, who, autonomous through mere reason, that is, through philosophy, prescribes the right norm to his whole life; But so to say, everyone wishes to be actually a philosopher now, he cognizes this ideal of humanity at least according to its form, and wishes to actualize it. It is in one the generally prevailing conviction that the community life, spanning the individuals with all their activities and values, ought to be according to philosophical norms in order to be truly reasonable. The idea of strict science is under the title philosophy from free reason the overall and all reigning cultural idea – as long as actually the Greek mind reigns and the Middle Ages do not break in and thereby streams of the traditionalist religious culture and the religious movements of Christianity reigned by motifs of the mood, and mix with the Greek idea of culture. Its influence is still to be seen in the new Jewish and Christian theologies and the attempt to form the religious convictions as contents of cognition through philosophy and to optionally justify them against the “natural” reason. But certainly, even the natural reason has, as we explained, for the “Middle Ages” (the type we name by that) not some authority independently resting in itself, and one for each and everything, thus for religious contents as well, normalizing rights and limits of acceptance, but rather one that is only derived from the previous authority of the belief.

<C. The development of the philosophical cultural shape in the Middle Ages and in modern times>

Thus the enormous change, happening with the development of the medieval mind is understandable. The ancient mind of free humanity culture, that is, the idea of true humanity carrying pure Hellenism, that of a genuine cultural life from free philosophical reason, looses its force and stops being a piece of content of the general consciousness. If the philosophers were the representatives of free reason’s reigning normal principal before that [90] (as that representing the form of genuine humanity according to the idea), thus the priests are the representatives for the new basic principle of all norms, the *civitas dei*. If the philosophical community was so to say communistic and the guiding idea carried by no encompassing social will, thus is the corresponding community, that of the priests, now imperialistic, reigned through by a unitary will. Its idea of the *civitas dei* is incorporated by it into the whole medieval community life as a normalizing final idea and by it in general practically determining for the cultural movement, and this with the help of its authoritative position within the public consciousness.

European humanity has as the medieval one its full continuity with the ancient one especially by Greek philosophy continuously working in a form giving way on the mental life – even if with the described reinterpretation and covering of its deepest sense of form. But mental change of the sense implies the intentionality of change and keeps hidden effective motifs of return. The natural light of reason does not stop – where it is not shut off – to be natural light, and to shine on its own accord, even if it is mystically interpreted as radiance of some supernatural light. And this interpretation can again fall away. Also no lost cultural idea is actually lost in the life unity of humanity, no life principle of the past actually and finally sunken. Unitary humanity has, as the single man, a unitary memory, old traditions can be revived, can again motivate, can again, no matter whether understood as a half or completely, whether originally or reformed, again become effective. It is the historian’s task to prove the renaissance of the ancient mind, the historically fundamental motifs in the concrete context of development and in detail. That, which we are interested in here is that indeed such a renaissance as a large liberation movement takes place, this shall be understood here purely according to the mental sense. Thus the old cultural idea once again becomes vivid and dethrones the medieval one. Church and theology stop representing the reigning cultural mind of humanity, the final idea growing and centered within it stops being the final idea of European humanity through it, it only lives as a piece of content of the [91] mere ecclesiastical doctrine and ecclesiastical theology, now representing one cultural area next to others, and which cannot assert the claim any more that the idea of the *civitas dei* kept by it was more than a norm it, the community of the priests, wishes to imprint on the environment, but is unable to. From then on the church has struggled for the renewal of the Middle Ages, but the Middle Ages are only as long an actuality as the whole humanity immediately or mediately accepts this idea in a practical way and puts itself voluntarily into its service.

Certainly some conflicting nature is thereby named in humanity and culture of the modern times. The church uses its influence on the spirit of the age in the following centuries and it represents a thin, now again swelling tendency in the general disposition of culture, a now and then reinforcing thin stream of a medieval mind within the modern times. But however it works in a religiously-societal way, theologically-literally – it cannot give any generally working force to the medieval idea, and even the political Catholicism does not mean any connected unity of vivid conviction yet within the big political party since the cultural struggle, that is, connected through the idea of the *civitas dei*, actually reigning inside.

1. The modern times as the break through of a general disposition of a self-responsible statement on all given theoretical and practical convictions – as a liberation movement, that is, as a philosophical liberation movement, that is, as renaissance of the ancient cultural life of a reasonable humanity life from philosophical reason (science) and as a religious liberation movement, that is, as renaissance of the old Christian (or believed to be old Christian) religious ideal of a religion from original religious experience, from original sources of belief. Both, friends at first, necessarily separate. The last authority, all norm is bound to, for reformation lies within the belief, for philosophy though, the belief is in the best case one of the sources for cognition and is, as all sources of cognition, subject to free critique. Philosophy is absolutely independent, “reason” is the normal principle itself for the belief and the limits of its right. Religion is for the philosophical freedom the theme of a proper critical philosophy, the philosophy of religion, which is not based in the belief in the way of theology and has its final norm in it, [92] but prescribes norms to the belief itself. In the development of the reason’s critique there is a proper critique of ethical and religious reason, which has to first of all discover the essence, possible limits of this reason. And if it finds religious experience as a fact, it still demands to determine the right and the limits of the same in the freedom of the critique. The spirit of free reason, the renaissance of ancient freedom of mind, that of philosophy, prevails, becomes the spirit of modern times as such.
2. This “modern” standing towards the belief does not mean a rejection of belief as religious experience, neither a rejection of some essential content of belief, although it means the claim for freedom, to say yes and no, that is, the freedom to decide for atheism (similarly as the free critical standing towards the mathematical, which science itself demands in critical consideration; the antecedent freedom itself means to say yes and no to 2 x 2 = 4). But certainly the autonomy of reason means a rejection of the obligation preceding all decision, to tolerate the content of belief in the authority of the church or the authority of belief itself prior to the free critique. And thus simply means the position taking against the Middle Ages – which is thus characteristic for the modern times.
3. The modern times differ in the way philosophy or science represent the reason’s autonomy as the source of all authorities and of all acceptances as such in antiquity, that is, on the basis of the difference between ancient and modern science. The modern times also practice their free reason at the traditions of ancient science, which as a whole has entered into modern times under the title philosophy in drafts contradicting themselves. It only finds one special science, which was generally accepted in ancient times already and was not mingled in the struggle of philosophies, had not found different and contradicting illustrations in different systems, mathematics.

The beginning modern times see mathematics as the original of actual and genuine science. They do not only continue it, it turns the will to freely create life, inflamed in enormous power, from pure reason towards a scientific order of the world. That, which Antiquity performed in narrowly limited mathematical [93] problem spheres and in narrowly limited methods, is a mere beginning for the modern times; with audacity it strives to some universal mathematics and in the freest logical shaping of the method. Likewise the small beginnings of strict natural science in Antiquity – a universal natural science, universal laws of nature as such and a mathematic natural science, striving for a universal deductive system to be designed according to the example of geometry, becomes the goal, and it is indeed accomplished to mount a natural science of this style in the same force vanquishing everything, as mathematics accomplished it previously. The endlessly manifold facts of nature’s experience loose their singularization, all really possible facts are encompassed within a limited number of basic laws, in which endlessly manifold laws are encompassed as mere deductive effects, from which they may be derived in a deductive and systematical way. This law system of the real options contains the explaining reasons for all facts and empirical regularities. The tasks of discovering pure physics, the science of the explaining laws, and the tasks of the description of empirical facts as mere starting point for their rational (physical) explanation. The universalist trait passing through mathematics and natural science from the beginning, designates the general character of modern philosophy and science. It had already been arranged in the Platonic idea of philosophy, but the will to a universal, systematically universal all cognition, a science taking fields into systematic work and completely encompassing every single field of this kind through universal problems and method does not gain the all sovereignty within “philosophy” in Antiquity.

And the modern times do not only have the guiding idea of a universal science, but of a universal one strictly explaining from last principles and finally justifying itself on every step; at least in a practical way it has the success to have formed enormous sciences in such a firm shape, like it has sprung from theoretical reason, vanquishing theoretical reason, so that no skepticism may doubt the objectivity of its acceptance. It wishes to create a *universalia scientia* following the example of geometry and the new mathematical natural science, of [94] the same objectivity, the same stringent force of conviction. Bacon’s *institutio magna* stands at the head of the modern natural scientific movement as an attempt of distribution performed from general principles of scientific tasks towards a system of sciences and Descartes’ idea of a universal science only distributing itself in all single so-called sciences, which is one, as reason is one, having sprung from the all-cognition.

1. Idea of the absolute justification. Critique of reason.[[5]](#footnote-4)
2. The practical idea of a universal culture from reason; highest effect of the Platonic ideal, not a mere ideal, but a universal will as a common will, some entelechy.[[6]](#footnote-5)

Appendix I (on page 3): <Beginning of an earlier version of the first article on renewal>

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The reawakening of a deep interest in philosophy, rooted within the most inner personality may be observed in Germany and especially among the academic youth since the turn of the century. The sorrows of the years of war have arisen it enormously. When the generation from the trenches filled the lecture halls that had long been deserted, their zeal to study was not only directed towards the education in special sciences for the special professions they had chosen. The philosophical lectures, directed towards listeners of all faculties, were against all expectations among those with the most visitors. To see these new listeners was deeply moving for the philosophical teacher. A gleaming desire for the eternal ideas, implying the sense of the world and the human life, spoke from beaming eyes. The zealous participation in the overfilled seminars proved at least for an enormous part of the listeners that they were not only looking for self-forgetfulness in contrast to present’s hard distress, that they did not only wish to let themselves be lifted by such beautiful philosophical literature of the world, by the rhetoric of large systems and big words; that, which they rather wished for, was the instruction for independent scientific work, for the purpose of a critical free position to that which has come down to us, based on secure foundations. This youth had returned for the most part with a deep repulsion against the idealist activity of military rhetoric, nay even with a heavy distrust against the philosophical, religious, national ideals put into the service of war propaganda. [95] It longed for an escape from the inextricable chaos of truth, faithful lie, bold slander, from genuine and distorted ideals and emotions. Radical truth in word and deed was its will: It wanted to build a new world in the spirit of pure truth. Philosophy was the scientific place of radical self sense-investigations for them. A new philosophical movement, called the “phenomenological” one, quickly spread in these circles, in the middle of the political, national, religious, artistic, philosophical chaos now called Germany and according to the larger horizon European culture. It regards the “transcendental phenomenology”, a new philosophical basic science and method, which had its first breakthrough at about 1900 already, as nothing less than a source of salvation, from which our degenerated culture is able to incrementally renew, to become by recovering with its help, a culture with true roots, conscious of its deepest sense and fulfilling it. Such a conviction will first seem quite disconcerting, and it could easily arouse a critical prejudice in the readers who have not gained any knowledge from their own studies: as if it was some kind of philosophical occultism, some fantasy draped as a “science” or a romanticism of concepts, which has gained its credit among others of its kinds in these confused times and has seduced towards exuberant hopes. Such notions meanwhile are as distant as heaven from philosophy. It is exactly the sense of the phenomenological reform of philosophy and of all sciences that it does not accept any of the sciences, how exact ever they are, lying at hand as already scientifically accepted in the highest sense, in the radicalism of its demands for scientificity, that it only believes possible final scientific science in all spheres of cognition through the use of its fundamental sources and its method. If scientific strictness is in the former sense already the result of some sober objective work of thinking, then the phenomenology is all the more a sphere of most sober objectivity, in which there may be even less room for lavishness than even in mathematics. If this is the case though, how shall, this is what will be asked in a perplexed way, the new building of a sober science imply the force of salvation for our whole culture?

Let us avoid the tendency to deny our interest due to such so to say apriori concerns against phenomenological renewal movement, where its proper sense is still unknown to us. Let us try to understand this sense. Two things are needed for that: first an explanation on the sense of phenomenology itself with respect to the pure ideas philosophy and science, and second on the sense of our European culture, as far as it is concerned with these ideas. I may suppose that especially the reader of this journal, which, as its title expresses, wishes to be the organ of Japanese movements for renewal, will be interested in these questions, and the more so as I believe to be allowed to link the Japanese nation to “European” culture, as a young flourishing bough. If it participates with zeal and success [96] in European science and philosophy, then European culture’s specific distress, which, as we will see, is closely related to science and philosophy, may not remain foreign to them. Their renewals must have most inner sources of motivation in common with our [renewals] and among those also with the phenomenological renewal drawing on the radical points. Let us begin with the second topic, the treatment of which can make us receptive for the peculiar sense of phenomenology itself and its cultural function at the same time (a theme which may remain for another article). Maybe that on closer consideration of the sense of our European culture the philosophy’s and the science’s prerogative doubted above can be justified in its frame of senses prior to all other cultural forms, maybe that thereby the prerogative of our culture can be seen prior to any other one exactly as an “intellectual” culture, and in the following we possibly gain thereby <breaks off>.

Appendix II (on page 29): <Both ways of living of the individual personal life>

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We contrast two ways of living in the individual personal life. 1. The man lives a naively natural life, whether he passively lives for the day, whether he sets universal purposes to himself, purposes regulating his whole life, for example professional purposes (possibly in the way to become known thereby or to surpass all others in wealth, in power and the like). There are many differences. a) The passive life, setting its targets by the moment, and indeed always is anxious to sustain itself, without having an idea of self-preservation, self-organization though as a conscious general purpose. b) Another life, also to be called passive, living in the community and its tradition, getting purposes from it, as if somebody chooses any job, solely because everybody must have a job, demanded by the community, without feeling appointed by himself, from his inner, and now performs his daily work in the usual and demanded ways.

A higher form is the self-legislation from a purpose posited from inside and spread over the whole life, as exactly a true profession. The whole life context indeed, the concrete lifetime is subject to this, still not in each and every life activity. The time filled with one’s profession is not the whole lifetime (you do have your free hours and you are a man beyond your profession.) The second case now is that the point in time will come in human life, in which man forms his idea of a purpose and takes it into his will, which regulates every pulse of his life, each and every one of his activities. Such an idea is a newly grasped religious idea or the universal ethical idea: I want to make my life from free reason the [97] best possible. An analogous contrast in the community life corresponds to this contrast in the individual personal life.

The final idea may be one, which is to be justified against reason or not in the individual life, and likewise in the community life. Somebody can make the mammon his God; to become rich and ever richer can become his whole life’s reigning idea. The overambitious and the power-hungry (domineering) is the parallel to the greedy; To reign other ones and preferably large circles of other ones becomes the final purpose of life, all life is sub<dued> to. The power-hungry can have his final goal in achieving as much as possible, to set ever new and ever larger and more difficult practical goals (in a certain practical sphere) and to assert them. To attempt ever more dangerous adventures audaciously and courageously and despite any mishaps proceed from success towards ever larger successes all in all, that is the way of living he wishes, and to create a world constantly testifying his performances in an objective way and bringing them home to him himself constantly, that is his joy. Thus the king of industry, the big master of commerce, etc. Everyone has a field of values before his eyes, but as a man of power he is not properly directed towards a maximum realization of such values, but to get such values *in infinitum*, to force them, to enact them by his energy, intelligence, etc. The one ambitious for performance: to perform as much as possible within a sphere of possible performances of the value, to achieve as much as possible and preferably something big: not in the attitude towards the ability here, but to the works. Thus the correlative attitude: to bring as much works into the world as possible, scientific, artistic ones, etc. to people the world with my creatures.

Appendix III (on page 36): Man as subject of goods and works, subject of culture

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The animal as well has purposes, also purposes remaining relative and accordingly permanent shapings of purposes as well, only man has culture, the rational being. Only man’s striving is subject to consciously guiding final ideas (and not merely peramently directed instincts) and has accordingly an endless number of horizons, only man strives, acts, works in creating lasting works serving permanent purposes, beyond the day and the hour. A lasting work though is not a work for a momentary need, but is accounted for an open endless repetition of the same person’s same needs, of different persons of the same circle of community. Its purpose is an open infinity of the same purposes, synthetically unified within an idea. Every instrument, every object for use, a house, a garden, a statue, an altar of sacrifice, a religious symbol, etc., all these are examples. To fulfill an infinite [98] infinity of purposes, related to the open infinity of persons and really possible occasions, is “the” purpose of such a cultural object. And this relates to every cultural object as such. Only he has simply an endless life horizon in front of himself in all his striving, related to an endless spatio-temporally causal nature and an endless open multiplicity of other men, with whom he lives commonly, lives an open endless unity of the community life. Only he considers the infinity and considers that, which creates something useful beyond the momentary satisfaction of one’s needs, the future useful and harmful consequences, that is, the repeatable connection of purpose as well and thereby permanent usefulness of that, which has already performed a present purpose function and provided satisfaction. Only he has the idea of the (permanent and general usefulness), of the permanent and possibly general good, and it is related to some infinity, to the “open” life horizon. Only he therefore creates instruments, houses, weapons and the like, which imply the endlessness of possible repetition of purpose activities as well as the aiming of goods of always the same kind for the needs of a type repeatable in open future as a permanent meaning, and which he equips with this meaning, which he has appointed this lasting practical sense to.

Only man is a person and not only the subject of activities, but he sees himself as the subject of an open horizon of living and working, constantly threatened by death as breaking of this awake life and free work, and still an end, which in its indeterminacy is only a ceaseless threat into infinity, endlessly remaining itself. Only man has a fate, has consciously in view the open infinities of the contingencies inhibiting his free working, inhibitions, disturbances, resistances, only <he> [has] his personal self-preservation, determined by the consciousness of the manifold infinities in his life and striving implied in himself, in external nature, in the animal world, in the human world encompassing him as a member, only he strives for “blissfulness” and rises towards endless purposes, towards purposes being final ideas, implying single purposes of a lower order, single purposes being already final ideas themselves as all human purposes, as we have described it above, the endless tasks only becoming finite in the form of endless repetition of the same purpose activity with the same useful performances. Only man has “ideals” and ideal goals demanding the climbing of endlessly many steps, only man devotes himself to the science for example, in which every reached step is a permanent purpose shape, a lasting good with the immortality described before.

The animal is bound to reality, that is, it blindly, passively follows the force of motivation of the affections assailing it, the affections of the senses, the affinities, the desires, the realizing tendencies passively having an impact. Man is free, the option precedes the actualities for him. He dominates the actuality by dominating the options.

[99] The idea and the idea system of reason, the ability of the universal preliminary consideration of the options to be drawn into endless horizons, the ability of free restraining all “statement”, that is, all impact of the reigning steps of transcendent purposes, of a universal reckoning their values, and the order of the best possible life having its impact on them, and a surrounding world, equipped with the best goods according to it, belong to the system of consciously given and motivating infinities. Only he turns thereby necessarily back to himself, evaluating and setting purposes, and considers the best possible life together with and correlating with the best possible personal being. Culture is a concept, pointing thus back to man as a reasonable or free being. All, this concept encompasses, stands within horizons of infinity and among them in horizons of the infinity of evaluations and possible showing of values, which as all questionable infinities enter the consciousness and themselves motivate human life and working. Thus actual human life is a cultural life according to his essence and as far as it is not, man is still an animal and according to his essence striving up from lower towards ever higher forms of reason.

Goals of the will. The organic nature develops and forms as a unity of life, self-containd by unifying “life conditions” (universal unity of the earthly life), a system of development shapes, encompassing a system of development ideas (species), with a corresponding type of becoming a development repeating itself in countless individuals, in which those ideas of a species “normally” realize more or less completely. And this whole system of ideas and of realizing developments (ontogenesis) is itself again developing. New species with new ontogeneses emerge, and the phylogenesis as well shows an upward direction, that is, towards the development of higher and highest shaping. This “determination” towards ideas and towards the conception of new ideas, this “more perfect” or less perfect realization of the ideas and the development of ideas of a higher step reigning ideas does not mean a determined striving of conscious beings, no usefulness; the ideas are not intentional shapings of a consciously performed ideation. The animal has a consciousness and has its bodiliness, has its organism, but it is not an organism. But its body is an organism for it in the new sense, a system of consciously given organs practically available to him, available as organs of perception, and as organs for an action of the will working into the surrounding world outside of it as a surrounding world of consciousness. The animal has its biophysical organism, but it has it conscious only as a unity of its current experiences, and its immediate working relates to the consciously constituted one, the way it is exactly constituted for it: All subjective working is directed towards something experienced, towards something clearly or vaguely imagined, possibly thought, etc., towards a unity of consciousness as such. The animal acts in the improper sense, it acts according to its drives, and when it uses means for the goals of the will and also cognizes them as means [100], then it remains at the single case. Even the ape, using a means, which once was apprehended by it as useful for a purpose, and which he used, and reuses it in every similar case from now on, does not know anything like a device, like an instrument, like a stick, as a lasting thing of purpose, lastingly determined, lastingly lying available and laid at hand to serve in the same way for every similar case presumably supposed to emerge.

Man alone does not only have singular practical options in front, but he overviews open horizons of options in the form of consciously constructed more or less determined infinities: Related to that only man has not only undetermined singularities, but singularities, accompanied by an open horizon of similar singularities as coordinated options and in further consequence singularities of generalities (something single of a kind) and generalities as ideas, accompanied by an endless scope of possible singularities of their kind: Only man does not only imagine (does not only think) in generalities, but he judges, he desires and wishes in generalities as well. And by his thereby thinking into options, options he forms in a fantasy way, in which he thinks of himself in a working and acting way and savors their possible goal values in a fantasy way, he frees himself from the striving and the necessity of singular actualities, of the driving stimuli of the experienced actualities, the singular ones, real options forcing themselves towards him by anticipating assumption and struggling in the force of the stimuli. Entering into the realms of free options and into the constructive game of infinities he stops the actuality and becomes a freely choosing subject; he does not only choose between given singularities, but he also relates them into the universe of options, which may practically come into consideration.

Appendix IV (on page 66): Religious impact of legends, poetic formations

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When reading the evangels I am not all moved by the wonders. But the figure of Christ, as legendarily undetermined as it remains (in contrast to the individually determined figure of Paul), as he shows himself in his ethical basic directions by some statements and parables, it awakens a realm of complete goodness within me. I have the evidence that a doing of that kind (as it is demanded here) is a purely good one, that it would be a bliss to be able to be like that, which, the way <it> is, should arouse love and purest love in me. And Christ himself stands there for me as not just demanding, but himself as a perfectly good one, as viewing pure goodness, in pure love turned towards all men, as nursery of a possible purely good thing, as understanding all and all forgiving, and I can only imagine him as the embodiment of pure human goodness: as an ideal man. I read the evangels like a novel, like a legend, I empathize [101], and I am filled with an endless love towards this superempirical figure, this embodiment of a pure idea, and filled by the bliss to know this person being vividly related to me – and while this force is streaming from this ideal figure, it already has some reality for me, I believe in this legendarily individualized idea and it becomes a force in my life. And now I understand the believer, who believes in the historical individual Jesus in viewing this ideal figure, given at the same time through a constant tradition he cannot doubt, and in all wonders and in all the first tradition of the evangels predict of his resurrection, of his relationship to God he witnessed himself, etc., and likewise in that, which the evangels report on the own experiences; then in that, which the saints report on the bliss of their faith, etc. Love for an individually shaped idea in connection with a tradition related to the individual, handing itself down in this idea, makes receptive for the historical belief and the belief in historical truth as a truth of facts and at the same time truth of salvation. The force of salvation, which I actually experience, and which derives from the idea, gives power to historical religion, and I do not only have the existence of a Jewish person as content of the facts, who is the origin of the legend, but for the existence of God (if I do not already believe in him in advance, and univocally in the sense with the belief in God demanded here) and for the relation between father and son, etc. I have an original picture idea of Christ as a “God man”, of Paul the idea of the most noble preacher full of God, and of a struggling man, speculating in his struggle, of a searcher, striving to help himself and other believers in Christ towards clarity and a pure life, to find the corresponding norms, etc., in his concrete demands of the day.

It does me no harm, and it does not diminish the result, if I think of Christ himself as a struggling man, who felt the vocation within himself to bring himself to view the pure shape of the ideas, to actualize it within himself, and who succeeded as well as is conceivable within man. If I then consider that he stood there as elevated above the common, aroused such love (love idealized) that soon the absolute actualization of the idea was seen, experienced within him, and now the belief grew, which also took over mere human things (although not aberrations from pure human goodness), thus the wonders (in their interpretation as wonders), etc. A figure of novel (the artist certainly needed to come close to Christ himself) could have the same impression on me.

A belief can have an ideal truth and an enormous personal force of effect, and a highly ideal one, even if he is inflicted with contingencies. But these contingencies then determine the apprehension of the world. Christ is related back to the Jewish monist God in his belief in God, like he has shaped himself towards Christ as an idea, the God of the psalmist D<avid> and of the prophets. A hidden rationality is also often implied in that, which has historically become, which in the passionate struggle for the fulfillment of religious (as on the other hand of artistic) intentions, for intuitions of salvation, for that, which may bring salvation [102], may give hope and support, arrives at fulfillments, which, however relative they are and demand new deeper fulfillments within time, still may carry a moment of true fulfillment. Thus popular ethics, as they form themselves in different steps of humanity, are no rational ethics, but always have a core, which is genuine and leads upwards.

What was man if he could not view any adorable men, purely good men. He can only become good, if he sees good men, if he uplifts himself at examples, and rises through them. He can only become good with the help of glorifying love, reworking the loved one into an ideal, which only wants to see the good in him. To always see the good in the others, to see the good of them as far as possible, improves and arouses pure brotherly love, which itself is the way to become better. Through pure joy in the action of love.

You do not make any experience through the critique of the others exposing their errors, but through concrete loving viewing of their goodness, showing itself in the evidence of pure fulfillment of the love intentions as intentions of value (even if they are idealizing ones).

Of course you also gain experiences through creative fantasy or through intuitive entering into creative figures of fantasy of noble artists. That is the material of experience of the ethics as the experience material of aesthetics, the intuitive entering into art figures as such, and the experience material of logic, which is “intuitive” entering into scientific shapes. In which way is the experience material of “pure” theology given? And of true divine love and true doctrine of religion, related to the fact? But if I want to judge the de facto status of the world in ethical and aesthetical relation and of de facto art and ethical art, then I need the norm on the one hand and sober critique on the other, judging the degree of approximation and regarding good and bad moments in the same way.  
I need intuition, I need original “religious experience” and I need the idealization, enclosing the pure, completely filled [object], which needs to be persevered thereby in a purely intuitive way. But our area of intuition is perhaps too tight and the intuition is too clouded and incomplete. And all attempts of pure formation fail, since the religious intuition presupposes the most universal intuition of absolute givennesses. Perhaps we need therefore the universal phenomenological world consideration and [world] intuition, the freeing from all blinkers, a universal historical intuition in this phenomenological attitude, in the same way as a universal intuition in nature, and on top of that possibly a developing of the sciences as such, which are in themselves brought into the “intuitive” status, that is, need to be brought from symbolically habitual knowledge into [knowledge] clearly taking place. Perhaps man is given the task, to be forced to create religion in a double sense: one time religion as an ongoing myth, as a one-sided and genuine intuition of religious ideals, surrounded by a horizon of apprehension, in the infinities of which you do not enter, deferring to that, which cannot be researched, and one time religion [103] as a metaphysics of religion, as the final termination of universally understanding science, as a norm for all intuitively mythical symbolism and regulating their formations of fantasy and transformations.

The universal absolute science aims at a universal absolute life, coherent in itself, which necessarily wants to and must arrive at all-sided univocality within itself; and every single Ego, linked into it, must search for salvation, and it needs to guide it to find salvation through the insight that everything in the world strives up towards unity and has a relation to the search for salvation, and that the finding of salvation is the act of the free men, and that the whole world eventually is an endless “harmony”, an endless way of all towards freedom, in which everyone has his function and his step.

Appendix V (on page 68): <Church and Christian science>

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Belief thus as genuine conversion or genuine original succession is a free deed. And renewal of this freedom in the genuine confessorship is the theme of the original Christian preachment. The same belongs to every originally instituted religion in contrast to the grown and not instituted myth of mythical religion. Proper religion thus is the breakthrough of freedom, and church lies on its way, and, if it wishes to be a universal religion of humanity, the breakthrough of a conscious tendency of a freely generated culture, towards a renewed, genuine one, or the formation of a consciously shaped entelechy within culture and culturally active humanity, directed towards a new humanity, an individual and common one, towards universally to be shaped anew systems of the orders of community, of norms of all individual shapings and shapings of community, norms of self-education towards the new man and similarly of the self-education of humanity towards a new humanity. Christian science does not have the function to effect belief, but at first is a means of apologetics and shall serve to dissipate the struggle between “natural reason” and revelation (revealed content), asserted in objections, and to justify this against “reason”. Natural reason thereby is the theoretical truth given prior to revelation and next to it. Christ emerges in the world, which is an experienced world (in a time of Greek and other culture, Greek science, etc.) This world is a fact, which may be cognized, irrespective of the “faith”. There were also attempts in philosophy to make scientific statements on the purpose of the world, on the sense of human life, on just and unjust things, good and stupid human goals, etc., to teleologically prove God’s existence, mmortality of the soul, etc. This natural science must be reconciled with the belief, and the belief’s content itself thereby becomes the theme of theoretic judgments following the belief, but not establishing it. Belief thereby plays the role of the natural theo-[104] retic experience: just that experience may possibly be corrected, partly through new experience, partly mediately through thinking, belief, but – nay, the original belief may be the same in there; in the exchange of the belief’s experiences of the first communities, nay, original ones in the progress of the belief’s experience in getting to know Christ, etc., the original belief is enriched and possibly corrected, but a dogmatized belief develops within the community as the norm of belief, and the belief becomes traditional on top of that, is acquired through tradition, and not originally taken on one’s own accord – thus a tension grows between every later original experience of belief and the consideration of reason being based on that, on the other hand the dogma, the demand of tradition. This demand though is added to the belief itself as a demand of belief, and a second following revelation [is] asserted for it, or a constant revelation [is] claimed. And this is then the main conflict: There is a double tradition, namely that, which delivers the picture of Christ himself, developed within the evangels, his speaks, legends, parables as well as the letters of the apostles still grown from original intuition, and the like, that is, an original tradition, which is able to arouse the belief intuitively understood in the following, to effect an original experience of the belief. And the ecclesiastical tradition with its unintuitive dogmatizations, in which one believes, but its original character of experience may be doubted (apart from that experiences of the belief within the vitae of the saints).

Protestantism of reformation is the breakthrough of a new freedom of statement, that is, on the ecclesiastical tradition of belief, and performance of a free acceptance of the content of belief, witnessed by the original scripts, or rather, later performance of the original experience of belief of the oldest communities and denial of the dogmas’ traditionalism and of their origin from new revelation.

The Middle Ages live in the traditionalism and a science bound by it, which essentially wishes to be theology; not apologetic any more, by no means any more. They simply wish to also have a science of the divine things and of man in relation to God, and express that, which they experience in the belief, understand it theoretically, draw theoretical consequences, and create a universal philosophical system, a universal science according to the ancient ones’ example, or rather, Aristotle’s, which simply gives the universal theory for the absolute actuality (God, man, nature in one), and which as that does not only offer the universe of real facts as facts, but also the universal teleology, prevailing in them, and the universal norms of the right life, of the single and community one, at the same time the universal norms for true men and communities of men themselves – but all related to the basis of the revelation and of the dogmas. The true Christian world shall be justified theoretically and therein dogmas as well (as far as possible), on the other hand it is a norm of justification as pregiven within belief. This is in itself not contradicted of course by beginnings of strictly objective natural science being present in the Middle Ages, also beginnings of cognitive theories, etc. Traditionalism was implied [105] in the principle of ecclesiastical dogmatizing and in the form of the ecclesiastical empire, which did not prescribe norms of cognition, but external norms also for scientific acceptances, and on the other hand demanded absolute respect for all following times and enforced it as a whole. It supported a substantial traditionalism, a binding to authorities, also where these were not actual authorities of the belief.

The idea of the *civitas dei*, its reigning idea, is also the dominant guiding idea of the Middle Ages; it implies an ongoing realization of this idea within the current culture of humanity, and as a universal unified humanity culture as such (mystics). And it implies the idea in the more special (sharply opposed by mystic movements, but still reigning through the power of the church) form: that a universal science, centralized in a Christian theology and to be grasped in its universality itself as an enlarged theology, the appointed function was to be created for humanity communalized in the ecclesiastical empire, true culture, and to be guided up towards the state of the communalized childhood of God. We need to note here that indeed this medieval science explains wide and ever more growing spheres of the revealed and dogmatized content of the belief as scientifically not to be understood, but it separates itself something understandable and not understandable, and it still teaches to express that, which is not understandable, and to follow it in its deductive consequences, thus it gives norms there as well to the universal human practice of reason.

The ecclesiastical sovereignty of the world as an idea, or the idea of the *civitas dei*, implies, as the expression states, the thought that God himself rules his God’s people, Christianity, in the divinely instituted form of church’s government, or rather, rules and at the same time enlarges it by mental cleaning (mystics) in such a way that the whole humanity eventually receives the mercy of salvation currently, or could take a stand to it in proper freedom. He gives humanity the organ of reason within theology, a share in his reason within the self-realization of this way of salvation. The Jewish people are also organized as the people of God. But God rules here as a despot through the law, which needs to be blindly obliged to without understanding. The Christian state of God though rests on revelation and natural reason, he rules as an enlightened despot.

Appendix VI (on page 94): <On the idea of absolute justification>

<1922/23>

European culture has already revealed in modern times the basic character, which had already been implanted by Greek philosophy. According to its most inner sense it is or wishes to be a culture from autonomous reason and quite exclusively from autonomous reason. The 17th and especially the 18th century already called the new era, called the renaissance of the free (autonomous by reason) kind of spirit of Antiquity the era of enlightenment. One may smile now on the lavish self-evaluation [106] of the 18th century, one may rebuke the rationalization of mental life as shallow and limited in all cultural fields, there is still no doubt that the 19th century was no less “educational” and rationalist than the 18th, and that it only in a deeper sense, and better conscious of the difficulties of genuine rationalizing, is this and wishes to be. This struggle between the awoken reason and the powers of the historical actuality goes through the whole “European” history from its beginning. Reason indeed marks an essential feature of man as such, of the *animal rationale*. It is thus not a human life without reason, reasonable reckoning and considering can never be quite foreign to him. Thus all community life and the cultural formations growing within have sprung from the manifold reflections of rational activity. And yet we call the historical, we call from historical tradition the surrounding world constantly oppressing the man, we call the cultural world, determining all personal life and working, all planned life activity, but also every momentary deciding in a motivated way an irrational world; a world, against which man who has woken to autonomy rebels, which he cannot and does not wish to accept in such a way as it presents itself to him and develops on. It may have its size and beauty, emotions of admiration, its fruitful dignity, love and so on in large single shapings, in the main traces of its whole shaping in distinct development epochs, it may thus in a certain new way still be “rational” to an enormous extent, and justify itself against reason afterwards. And yet it is then irrational in itself. What does religion say: The world was created by the originally beginning logos, it is a reasonable world. This does not mean in its sense, it is a world grown from some blind unconscious thing, [a world,] which could be cognized afterwards through reasonable evaluation as a good one. Instead it is singled out by reason itself, attained by reasonable attaining. The new relation of man, of the combined humanity here projects into the religious, towards the sphere of the historical world, constituting in human work – in human sorrows, efforts, setting purposes, idealizing shaping. I as a reasonable being want to shape my world and myself in a rational way. I as a single man and I together with others – we men – want to create the best possible world and foster one another in the striving for the best possible self-formation according to one’s option. The idea of a perfect humanity and cultural world shines before us, the idea of a humanity life, in which every single one not only lives, but lives in the consciousness of reason, acts with insight and looks into all his acting, into the large context of the socially connected human community and the communalized acting and classifies according to principles of community reason, a life, in which everyone enjoys the highest satisfaction, which may be called human, that of an individual performance, creating the best possible in the context of a community combined in the best way and based on reciprocal love, and therefore knows itself to be carried by the love of all truly good subjects. What then does “enlightenment” want, [107] clarification of the final goals of humanity’s life, clarification of the final sense of man’s practical surrounding world, clarification of the sense of the pregiven world, radical critique?

Appendix VII (on page 94): Radical critique

<1922/23>

The world with all the beautiful and good having emerged in it, which has become blind or has become in incomplete, immature, unclarified rationality, which though also contains something bad and right in this blindness or unclarity, needs to uncover its right and unright, its good and its bad, its beauties and ugliness, its values and unvalues, and it is the goal to acquire on one’s own accord the beautiful, good, right exhibiting itself there, to create power for oneself and those having insight through the critique, the authority of the insightful reason, and to make it the basis of a newly to be shaped world in this revealed reason. The struggle for annihilation though is directed against the irrational, and the critique has here the function to prepare the respective rational shapings. The historical world is the world of pasts and the world of present, as far as it includes as tradition the reflections of the past. A new life, a new humanity demand a reformation of this living present partly through its critique, partly through the critique of the pasts themselves, which in their past forms, no more working now in original shape, cannot demand a new awakening, and eventually on the basis of the critically mediated evaluation of the data a formation for the practical acting designed in independent rationality. The autonomous man thus wants to build this new world, and eventually this demands a fundamental critique and to that a final sense investigation on final principles, even on principles enabling critique, enabling on the other side a true life of reason. According to that, which has already been said, a life of reason is not a life, which may justify a consideration of reason contingently entering from outside, and only possible as such, but a life, the subject of which itself can justify the reason of its alleged life of reason itself. A life of reason shall be a life, in which the Ego may be absolutely certain of its reason as an absolute reason. But this is philosophical life. The subject of reason though cannot be the isolated single-Ego, which is not and cannot be as an isolated one, but the subjectivity of community. All radical new formation of humanity towards an autonomous one presupposes a radical philosophy. And thereby we are at the analogous beginning of humanity’s liberating: through philosophy, and, in order to name its first pioneers, through Plato, or rather, through the Platonic Socrates.

[108]

Appendix VIII (on page 94): <The culture of modern times as culture from practical reason>

<1922/23>

We thereby have determined the sense, with which the European culture has emerged from Renaissance. We only produced a precise version of what the beginning modern times themselves proclaim as their new sense, as their axiological principle of form, according to which it intends to create thus a new humanity, a new cultural life, a new mental world. As soon as this principle has acquired the determinateness of a method to be taken, the modern times are actually there and developing. It begins as a philosophically-scientific culture in one with the new philosophy and special sciences emerging everywhere, it begins by its creating its specific organs in these. We need to always heed thereby that “philosophical and scientific culture” designates culture’s general shape of sense for us here and not the single cultural shape philosophy or science itself, neither mere characteristics of a complete culture through determination, that is may also imply this special cultural form in itself. In this latter sense the scholastic culture is a scientific one. But science means nothing less for it than the autonomous norm and critique of all acceptances, its principle is not “freedom”, but “authority”, and even science is not free science for it, science from autonomous reason.

Our interpretation of the sense of European culture in modern times (which we now call the European one as such) as the final idea consciously created within it and consciously made effective for its own development, still needs a deeper going clarification. We build on a supplement, which of course is necessary. The “Renaissance” does not designate itself as the birth of a new science as such, but as the rebirth of the ancient shape of culture. It views its cultural principle of freedom, and also more specifically of the freedom from scientific reason, which is new compared to the Middle Ages, as a resumption of the cultural principle of the admired Antiquity and of course rightfully so. The idea of a culture to be shaped from free reason is completely developed in Plato in the pregnant form of a philosophically-scientific culture and on top of that it is thought through in rich systematic development. In this pregnancy it does not only have its impact in the study rooms of philosophers from now on, but also gains a powerful strength moving the general development of culture.[[7]](#footnote-6)\* I do not say by that that the Greek, let alone the Hellenic culture, actually fulfilled this form of reason in all phases and on all layers, which its best ones had predelineated for it as its ideal form and norm in philosophical thinking. Suffice to say that the formal norm had an impact and, even if this was only in quite [109] mediated and shallow shapings, determined the cultural life. Certainly the rebirth of this Greek cultural will does not mean a weak connection or succession, it takes place in a will norm, giving an incomparably larger swing in the rationalizing of the life of community and culture to the modern times, as which we could ever observe in Antiquity, for which by the way the unique advantage of primal instituting originality remains in figures such as Plato. The modern times succeed to an unequally larger degree in justifying and extending sciences, which find by their methodical strictness general acceptance and highest admiration, especially of natural sciences. The enormous successes of the natural scientific technique at the same time lend a firm, unconditioned authority spreading into the masses to both ideas linking in that, the idea of the science and the rationalizing of culture to be performed through it. They institute a new belief in a new age of humanity, the age of “enlightenment”, or, as we may better say, culture from practical reason, of a humanity reasonably shaping itself in one with its surrounding world in an active way and progressively rising. And this, according to a doubtless accepted ideal, means as much as: Age of a humanity rationalizing with the help of the establishment of all possible genuine science and scientific technologies corresponding to them all.

Let us, by denying all exuberance of the modern times’ self evaluation with regard to the ideal almost already attained or soon to be attained, still accept the belief in ideas itself guiding them. Let us confirm to have the absolute acceptance of the idea of such a culture in its sense, as a norm, against which all genuine culture is to be measured, and according to which we need to shape our own [culture]. Let us also accept together with it the belief in the practical option of such a shaping, whether this is at least in the form of an endless progress, nay, even more, let us accept as well the belief in our conditioned duty of practical actualization, in this “categorical imperative of culture” so to say. Then this statement justifies (we here presuppose it own right without establishing it) our interpretation of the European culture as an interpretation of its true sense of the philosophy of history. Culture from free reason and on top, from free science driving towards the universal, then means the absolute idea of purpose, the acting absolute entelechy, which defines the idea of European culture as that of a unity of development, and, if the evaluation is a correct one, defines rationally.

Appendix IX (on page 94): <Original culture and civilization. Can the sciences of modern times give “bliss”?>

<1922/23>

Originally springing cultural life, original instituting mentality, directed towards originally seen values, shaping (objectivating) them into lasting goods in poetic activity.

[110] Civilization. The secondary cultural life, the exteriorized of a tradition, which has lost the inner sense of shaping and degenerates into valueless agility, substitute culture, mock culture, shrinking values.

Science. When is scientific culture an originally springing one, genuine to its root, genuine to its aim, genuine in its method, genuine in its performance?

If we speak of humanity’s mental life, then we do not mean the whole psychic life, not life in mere dull passivity, rather the universal realm of the free active life of men standing within the medium of reciprocal communication in personal community: the purposefully active life directed towards self-set purposes, the performances of which continuously objectivate in sensually embodied shapes of work.

These objectivations form the culture’s field of object. Cultural objects are formations of the social mind or at least within the social mind; insofar as they are individual products they still have an impact on the common mentality, they are a common good of the personal reshaping through their objectively sensual shape expressing mental contents in a comprehensible way, ready to be understood in it afterwards, to motivate a new setting of an end, new work institutions, as they the other way round are used to be socially motivated in their generation in simply such a way in advance. All activity of the mind is either originally performing, carried by original motivation in all phases and steps, moving within the frame of pure “intuition”, or it is a secondary activity economizing with passively grown “traditions”, traditional derivations of former, originally grown, or rather, created performance. Tradition may be understood as any kind of “taking over” of a mental performance formerly created through mere following in understanding. This may be completely external, symbolical, as a more or less empty prefiguration, without an actual understanding to be produced incrementally on one’s own accord in reproductive creation following the original steps of creation: According to the idleness of human nature a symbolic understanding (actually following in creating), whether it is a completely empty one, whether only to some small degree descriptive, is enough for the man to the widest degree. A work can only be multiplied in rough copies for the common man. And the copy is unable in advance, as an incomplete expression, to arouse actual understanding: or rather, it points back to an original picture, which is not to be brought to original givenness in the copy. But works do not only have an untrue impact through copies, but also in the form of the external imitation, which is superficially understood only in a half or an empty way, changed in some freedom according to sensual shapings. Like otherwise sensual formations of perception are only effective in the game of fantasy and their forms are only alterations of the experienced ones, thus the original formations coming from free activity will go over into a “secondary sensuousness” and have their impact from there like other sensuous formations, but then also determine the active doing of the man. Furthermore: emptying of meaning in the usual doing. The conventional. The custom, etc., the untrue one, [111] merely civilizing culture. The struggle for a culture true to the root, and with a clear sense, true to the aim.

It is obvious to think of the popular attempt to differ between culture and civilization. Indeed these are, if a contrast shall be meant, “mass phenomena”, or rather, phenomena of life communities of open subject multiplicities in which the described difference plays an essential role. Although not the only one. A people has (and not only had) a culture, as far as it activates as a people and in a creating way embodies in bodily expression originally creative mentality and moves it from this creating Eros, proceeds from mental creations towards new mental creations. It has a living culture, as long as this Eros, this love drive towards the “beautiful”, relatively completes itself in works, but is ever again driven away through them towards higher goals and creations of the work only enabled by them. As a people, this means, through the community life[[8]](#footnote-7)\* (may it have its depths, into which the light of reasonable mentality and its Eros does not enter) goes a higher mentality of community, a habituality mediated and combined by relations of community, always ready to go over into vivid desire and active driving forces and creative activities and from all works having sprung from such a disposition into the active following in experiencing, and practical succession, stimulated towards mental awakening and higher mental performance, to become enthusiastic. At best the single personalities have culture, but not the people itself there, where only individuals are able to perform such things, where they are at first suggestively motivated not carried, lifted by the general stream of such mentalization and enthusiasm, and are then driven up due to the general preconditions in the personal habituality towards activity. In such a way can a new awakening and a new revitalization of a past culture, its implementation into current culture be understood. Culture though has always its milieu of civilization, the productive vividness always has its milieu of externalized vividness, its milieu of sunken “conventional”, merely “traditional” mentality, not any more or merely understood, of a mentality being expressed indeed, but the mental content of which, with its original motivations, cannot be created afterwards any more, the motivations of which have possibly sunken and are completely dead: to only comprehend afterwards through historical scholarship, not as something to be reactivated any more in the form of a living statement and of newly established and originally justified and shaped disposition.

But it we look more closely then some peculiar conditions and most curious ones emerge, if we visualize in a vivid way single realms of culture, and especially if we regard the realm of science – we are especially interested in here -, since they essentially co-determine the fate of the times. We will let the science be represented for us through the scientific guidance of [112] the modern times, and we will exclude all those untrue sciences, the theories of which do not withstand logical examination. We will also only accept for the modern times that, which we have to ascribe the prerogative of an insightful method and logical values in the results; nobody will deny that modern science was a proof of genuine culture, scientific culture of course, in the onesidedness the word science already hints at. Does an age have produced greater scientists and performances of practical reason enabled by them, in last regard a bigger and more rational technology? And still, as you know, some kind of weariness towards science took hold of our time; a mood enemy to the science and streaming, whose call is: The sciences made us no wiser, the sciences do not deliver any genuine knowledge, they make us calculate the course of nature, but not understand, they give us the ordered knowledge for actual and possible facts, they give us laws as rules of order, they enable us to orient ourselves in the field of actual and possible being; they have built a wonderful technique of the ordering and conceptually determining thinking, in all areas of nature and mind, they have organized the cooperation of the formerly singularized researchers, the scientific work, organization, discipline, whether it be self-discipline assigning his limited scientific area and therein his problem, his place of profession to every researcher, makes everyone a soldier and in the best case the officer of an enormous world organization – that is the character of modern science. Certainly not a despot has created them, as eventually nobody has done for a military system of a common sense either. Everybody appreciates himself the necessity to confine himself, and to build the scientific tower, of which he only sees his small working place, to build from a place that is mentally true to him. There is nobody who has complete insight, even the insight we are now talking about, namely into the universality of an external performance of order and fixing, but what is even worse, such a performance only becomes possible through an endless succession of steps of performances making use of the reflections of old performances in symbolical form and without any constraint, to finally present their original sense, for higher performances. The scientific researcher has become the only worker at a large machinery, which he was able to love as along as its performances were able to astonish him and other ones – which has not been the case for a long time, one is not any more astonished by anything -, which he is not able to love seriously and in a high sense, since his cognition is missing the deepest understanding, which uncovers some mentality for him in it, having a necessary function from the deepest depths of the mind, a necessity of the teleology, leading back to the final thing, in which man as a man can only have a final interest: briefly spoken, in his eternal bliss. Are we more blessed than our ancestors, because we are able to make telephone calls without any wires and are able to speak over thousands of kilometers? Will our descendants be more blessed if they will be able to communicate with the inhabitants of Mars or Sirius? Will we be more blessed if all languages of the earth have been researched back over ten millenniums [113], when we have documented the names of all their kings, all battles, all temple cities, all artists, etc.?

If we enhance human forces into super forces *in infinitum*, if we let everyone’s forces be grown in such a way that he is able to handle the science any time and the universe of all science, nay to even establish every sentence any time, to imitate every acquired technical performance alone or together with his siblings: he would be slightly better off than we are. But would that make him be blessed?

You will say, bliss is a personal matter and is a mercy. May be. Quite certainly it is a divine mercy if I partake in it. But is it not necessary that I ask myself, how do I become blessed? How can I become that, how do I free myself from my blisslessness?

Appendix X (on page 94): <On the failure of actualizing the telos of the European humanity in the development of culture and science in the modern times. Five texts.>

<1922/23>

1. The character of European culture as philosophical culture, culture from “logical”, scientific, “theoretical” reason. Principle of the perfect justification, doctrine of principles, universal science of the principles of all final justification. This has developed <within> logic: guidance of development through the will towards principal justification, through reflection on the “method” of true cognition as such and true cognition in special areas. At the same time will to a universal[[9]](#footnote-8)\*, absolutely justified or to be justified science. A universal *sapientia* or *scientia*, which at the same time demands a universal mathematics, in Leibniz a first delimited idea of a *mathesis universalis*.

The overviewing, but not yet systematic, methodically logical worldview of the cosmological beginnings. Adjustment of the everyday language with its everday concepts to the newly built vague thoughts. Enforcement to newly create concepts of independent thinking and to transform the old ones and to convince other ones, to justify, to establish the judgments on the world deviating from the common. Contrast between “reason” and sensualness. The work on concepts leads towards paradoxes, the direction of the interest in reasoning towards the logical and its difficulties. Skepticism reaction logic.

1. That which quickly grows: mathematics of the spatial quantities and the quantities as such striving towards geometry, some universality, exact natural science striving towards universality. But also a universal descriptive natural science (natural history), which [114] is seen as preliminary step for the exact explaining mathematical science, sciences of the concrete and initially to be described natural shapes and types of natural events, the type of which was to be explained in an exact mathematical way in its spatiotemporal order and its causal generation. The natural science at first science of the physical nature, the physical organic included. But soon, already in the beginnings, the task of a science of psychic nature, of the psychic “within” nature, classified into it through physical bodiliness, is set. Idea of an exact science of the psychic, the complexes of psychic facts, conglomerated so to say within souls in bodies and of the rules of coordination of psychic facts and physical facts (psychophysics). Idea of describing the soul within the inner experience (determined by L<ocke>’s theory of cognition), a descriptive psychology and psychophysiology as such (psychic anthropology).
2. But then also the awakening of the historical humane sciences as such, the sciences of the societal historical man and of his cultural performances. These are descriptive sciences. Psychology with changing theories, struggling for the form of an objective, methodically secure science, in contrast to that the descriptive historical humanities with a firm success and in results obviously arriving at ever greater objectivity. Added to that philosophy, the alleged scientific metaphysics in unclear, disputing systems. The critics of reason, the transcendental philosophy and the systems of the transcendental idealism.
3. The positivist naturalism and the sensualism, brother to it. The exemplary status of the exact natural science. The way it determines the world concept as naturalism. The world a universal dead fact, a realm of facts, classified by accepted laws making all existent necessary in its being thus in its place. The inner contradiction between the sense of scientific striving with practical reason reigned by science, and the world sense allegedly shown by it. Freedom and necessity. The subject is regarded in psychology as a complex of soul facts, as a conglomerate of facts somehow ordered by laws, by still unknown exact laws – it becomes something senseless, something not to be understood. But psychology does not manage to find the laws of “nature” searched for here, the experimentally found regularities of the facts never wish to guide towards an exact nature of the soul. The need for cognition remains unsatisfied, but one does not really know why. But also natural science. Its method is performing. But it has something that is not to be understood, and the whole nature of natural science has something that is not to be understood from this side; thus natural cognition, the way it is now, cannot be absolute world cognition. It seems to be relative towards cognizing subjectivity. But what does this relativity mean? And the difficulty that subjectivity itself shall be an annex of nature? Metaphysics tries to absolutize subjectivity. [115] But it comes to no clarity and scientificity. In this connection the unclarity concerning the method and realm of humanities and their relation to the natural sciences and modern naturalist psychology.

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What was the reason for this inadequacy felt at the always successfully progressing modern science at the end of the 19th century?

1. The specialization of the scientific cognition in endless rows of single sciences, giving vast amounts of single cognitions in such an all-encompassing way that almost not a single special researcher was able to control them. Nobody becomes theoretically wise with the help of science any more.
2. They were quite satisfied with the special sciences, insofar as a fruitful scientific technique followed it, with the help of which they were able to achieve generally useful purposes, especially economic values, increase of life’s conveniences. But the more needs were fulfilled, the more were aroused, men did not become more satisfied by that.

Knowledge is power. Power over what? Over the world, to which men, the subjects of this power, belong themselves. What kind of power, to which purpose? Human bliss. Power over fate, preventing man from acting and living the way he wishes from his most inner base. But sciences are infinite as the world to be cognized is infinite. Thus science as a means of practical wisdom is useless.

1. Neither did the science increase the purely theoretical interest, nor did it make theoretically blessed. All groups of science, and not in the least the exact sciences, sensibly suffer from the unclarity of ts foundation, that is, the fundamental method, predelineating the sense of its work on cognition and eventually determining the rationality of its work on cognition proceeding and progressing in special single methods. The efforts for a fundamentally new establishment of mathematics and the mathematical natural science. Theory of relativity. The dispute on the sense of pure geometry and the necessity of its acceptance for nature. The dispute on the historical method, on the relation between natural science and humanities. All final methodical questions, all questions on the practical foundation of all sciences led towards the theory of cognition and logic. But sciences believed to be able to perform their foundation on their own accord. Disdain against philosophy, the criticism of reason, nay, it was itself made dependent on the single sciences, on natural science and psychology. Origin of all science in philosophy. Striving towards some universal world-encompassing cognition and one, which is to be objectively justified, to convince every reasonable subject through obvious establishment.

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[116] World, that means the objective world of facts we call nature as well as the animal world, and men being linked with a relation of society and making their own cultural shape. The cognition that such a life does not only need some sense investigation on the formal norm principles, or rather, on the most general shape of such a life in line with antiquity’s theoretical considerations as a general method of a reasonable life, but that it was to be shaped the more valuably in its dependence on the surrounding world, the more some cognition of this surrounding world determined the acting subject. By the general logical reflection it was supposed to become clear soon that all spheres of cognition are related to one another, that no science may be isolated, that they all need to depend on one philosophy. And likewise in a practical turn that eventually all sciences may gain a fruitful relation towards some possible acting, that they lost sight of the original sense, which to serve all sciences were called upon. They all were supposed to be organs of that one philosophy, a universal wisdom from final understanding insight. It gathers enormous treasures of facts and theories without exhaustion and teaches to use it in many ways: Just one thing it does not teach to be done, to understand the world and the existence of men, in order to freely shape it and us ourselves in the spirit of reason. But this is the one thing, which is needed, and not the blind consciousness of power, to be able to do so much as a scientist and through the use of science, and to ever again accomplish new “performances”. The urge of our time to perform is more reproachable than greed, and it is only some form of egotism, which in its shape of a science only increased the sufferance of humanity in a vast way. Phenomenology is the science of most sober sense investigations on the original sources of reason radically understanding itself and on the method of universal clarification of reason, which is not inhibited by any blinders, breaking through all irrational barriers of cognition, and which screens all science already performing, but also all to be founded from final obvious sources, and thereby screens the sense of the world itself, which is confined to us as the realm of our freedom.

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Greek mathematics, the mathematics in the spirit of Plato’s doctrine of ideas, is the first completed breakthrough of a science in our modern sense, the first “logical” science in strict, “exact” concepts and objective truths of the law, based on logical method. It is the first science striving towards principles and fundamentally justifying, the first, which is philosophical in a conscious way. It leads the further development of philosophy, and its insight becomes the prototype of “rational” insight, the insight in the higher sense of science. The development of philosophy is guided by it from Galilee on. Some universal world cognition in strict concepts and in some rationality, which may be justified by final principles in a strict method, becomes the ideal [117] of the new rationalism (renewing Plato’s tendencies). However the empiricist skepticism attacks the mathematical ideal of science and struggles against some philosophy as a rationalist science of the world, also the empiricist is generally, since he does not wish to be purely negativistic, guided by the idea of science as a justifying method and uppermost by a fundamentally establishing method. It is known, how the development leads towards successful single sciences and yet denies the original goal of a universal science of the world, a world cognition carried by scientific rationality. Technical disciplines follow the single sciences in many ways, and they serve in any possible way the scientific and political practice. But no scientific culture of reason, a true age of “enlightenment” does not come about by pure science. The scientific reason is not its hegemonicon, the passive masses are prey to the leaders driving them according to egotistic interest (individually and nationally egotistic). The wise friends of men are without any power, since wisdom grown from experience, from empirical intuition does not have the authority of an objective establishment, not the power of logically scientific transference of the countersense and the violation of proved firm laws or even against apodictically obvious principles being logically strict. The political, nationalist, the societal phraseology and argumentation have as much and more power than the argumentation of the most philanthropic wisdom. The single sciences bloom in their singularization; philosophy, which was called upon to give them final unity, is in disdain. The sciences having assumed an independent existence, believe not to be in need of it; and the practical man, living into the day, uses the sciences where they are of technical help, offer a means for the contingent practical purposes. The thought, reigning the former centuries, of humanity, newly to be shaped, and of a culture of reason, fundamentally to be shaped from ideas of reason, has lost its force. The real politician is beyond that, he smiles on the ideologies of past times. If the belief in the all governing reason has failed, which could come to an ever more pure self-consciousness in the philosophical struggle of humanity, and change it into some humanity as God’s child, its surrounding world into God’s realm on earth, lost its force, then man jumps into egotism and politically into the moloch of the idea of power, and dresses up his idol (especially in the nationalist shape) with idealist phraseologies, which stem from the melting room of eternal ideas according to their original sources of sense, which in their undistorted shape are totally contrary to all shapes of selfishness. The way skepticism shows itself as some positivist truth under the title positivism or fictionalism (philosophy of the as-if) or philosophy of the Übermensch in the scholarly or factual philosophy (it, negating the option of positive truth according to its fundamental sense, its presuppositions and theses), thus the practical skepticism of “real politics” of political and economic men of power, passes off its goals, its means, its works as reasonable and praiseworthy [118] ones – they, who strike all categorical imperatives’ faces having sprung from it.

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The European humanity has strayed off its inborn telos. It has fallen for sinful degeneration, insofar as it had become conscious already of this telos (had already tasted the tree of knowledge), but did not lift this telos towards most complete consciousness, nor remained by consequently performing it as its practical life sense, rather has become unfaithful to this sense.

We do not argue for some bad conservatism, which sees the measure and goal for renewals in some past’s shaping of culture, which has become.

As the individual singular man has his inborn telos, an infinite idea born into him, that of his “true” Ego and of his true life, which wakes, once it is within him, even if in an unclear way at first, makes up the categorical imperative of his further life, is determined to imprint a new shape, that of the supposed and justified life (as an idea) in a firm disposition on his life, or else that of a life in the shape of actualizing the categorical idea, that is, through a consequent will (centralization of the will within the idea of the categorical imperative) – thus for some humanity, that is, for humanity acting within the streaming unity of some societal and cultural life. It has inborn the idea of a true humanity, of a true life of community, which, having arrived at some consciousness of community once, becomes a categorical imperative of community. Both ideas, that for the single subject and for the subjectivity of community, obviously are closely related, insofar as the single subject can only live in community and belongs to its categorical imperative, that it is a member of community in the right way, and on the other hand the imperative of community includes the individual imperative, since the individual is a cell of community and his life is part of the community life.

Culture from free reason and uppermost from universal free science delineates the absolute idea of purpose, and at the same time the already active idea within European culture, that, which makes it some culture not rational yet indeed, but freely determining itself, more precisely, from free reason: but better still the correlative expression: this idea as humanity’s final idea makes it some humanity freely determining itself in autonomous reason. But this delineates with regard to the development of humanity the axiologically highest shape of development. But properly speaking this is not the right expression. If the ethicist is right, then not only is the life form of the categorical imperative better than everything else, it is absolutely demanded, and every other one can as such only then be of value, if it takes over the categorical form as the form of all values, possible and allowed within man’s life. This implies that every human value may enter into the categorical form [119], or rather, may only be some actual value, insofar as it has entered in this shape (not changing it itself “materially”). All our ethically practical evaluation is hypothetical, and if it is treated as an absolute one, then this implies the presupposition that it may and must of course enter in the form of the categorical imperative.

A man, a human life cannot be but only become rational, and it can only become rational, except in the becoming according to or under the influence of the categorical imperative, which has become conscious. Thereby it has the higher form of development, which is itself one, which is categorically demanded. All this also holds true for “man in large”. The naturally naïve human life prior to this shape of development may contain values and have beauty, that is, a value in itself – but then we stand in another, not practical way of evaluation, in which some naïve culture may have “height”, a value, which can even be higher than some culture of a categorical form, namely according to its cultural content regarded outside of practice, and according to all that we consider by abstracting from the categorical form. But the ethical man, whether he be without culture, still stands higher as such, he has the shape of the highest step of value, he is of “a good will”, he has an absolute value in that, whereas the highest still does not contain the fewest of an absolute value, but certainly, if it had the form of the absolute or could take it over, it immediately had quite a higher value. But certainly, are not all men with a good will ethically equal? Of the same human worth? Quite so. Every man of this form belongs into the world of absolute values, and this “absolute” has a double meaning: It is not a hypothetical value, and it is not a merely relative one, relative to subjects, as the “works of the mind”.

The man, already owning the ethical consciousness, that of the categorical imperative, from then on implies the final idea as a principle of his development in the form of some self-shaping through autonomous reason, some entelechy in quite another, nay in a most proper sense, in contrast to that of an organically blind entelechy, as a natural final type, towards which the organic grows according to its type. Likewise a community, which is not only the form of humanity equipped with community consciousness, but of one, which already implies its true entelechy within this consciousness (or which has already woken up towards the community consciousness of the absolute form). It no longer lives now within a culture of blind becoming, of some growth, whether it be for shapes of value (insofar for example some beautiful art grows in ever higher shapes as a realm of community values), but it is organized towards some unity of will, which is directed towards its true humanity as an absolute idea and which in this direction has taken on the form of an absolutely valuable development of humanity.[[10]](#footnote-9)\* As long as it lives within this development as a community and actualizes according to this truth in an ascending way, it keeps its absolute value. As soon as it gives up its entelechy [120], as soon as the entelechy within it has lost the force of an effective idea, has stopped being generally conscious and an effective purpose, this humanity decreases towards the status of complete sinfulness. The evaluation of humanity conscious of its entelechy is determined in analogy to that of the single man according to the degree of effectiveness, or rather, actualization. But the circumstances are still more complex here. Because here the question is: When does humanity, or rather, culture contain entelechy? When, we say, has this entelechy woken up not merely in individuals as that of community, but within community? It can only wake up in the individual, but it simply wakes up as an idea being a common acquisition, a common good, and it has its effect by its being always accepted as that and then necessarily taken over into the will, at least as a demand. And it then institutes a community as a community of interest, love and will in relation to this idea, itself as something demanded. It belongs itself now into the frame of the categorical imperative that every absolute value was to be honored and to be loved, that is, none was to be damaged, every value of development is to be fostered as far as possible. As well as that every being, every object containing the “aptitude” for an absolute value or even an infinite development of absolute values and the idea of an infinite value of development, was to be loved and fostered as that, to be cared for, etc. Thus for example the child or the natural man who has not woken up yet or naïve “humanity”, a people living in the “natural condition”.

By everyone who has woken up towards freedom respecting every other one as a man, he has, this also belongs to this imperative of reason, to respect every other one according to the achieved height of value, to place him above himself in this regard, and to possibly serve him in this regard. But it also depends on which values, taken in categorical form, are the highest then, or what was the best according to man’s essence as such and according to the given man in given circumstances, etc. “Egotistic” values? Does the enjoying one’s own true value imply worthlessness? Something devaluating? Not though the enjoying the other one’s values? Cognition of one’s own value and worthlessness is indispensable for progress. Is every self-satisfaction unethical, is not self-satisfaction there *a priori* when the value has been cognized in self-evaluation? Does the vice of self-satisfaction not mean something else, namely the wrong finalizing, absolutizing of one’s own value in connection with hubris against others? Instead of seeing oneself in the mirror of infinity, thus having in view the infinity of the demanded, not actualized value, against which the finite achieved is small, and on top of that not seeing that it is not the task to posit a value within the world, but to be good, in order <to> live good into infinity.

Every good man is like some mental value a “common good”, and thus is he himself as a value not a proper acquisition for the good man, but a common acquisition, and he may only have the joy in himself, which everyone may have in him (as he must always do that, which everyone must want him doing. But this simply belongs to his absolute value).

[121] The difficulty now is: When is this community all-encompassing to such a degree that we say the whole corresponding humanity of culture (nation or European humanity) is conscious of its entelechy and has accepted it as that, as its categorical imperative? Or is this only a *facon de parler*? The spirit of autonomous reason “rules” in the age of enlightenment. But eventually there were enough men who did not know anything of entelechy, and quite self-contained classes and communities (the traditionalist ones of the church), fighting against this new spirit. Eventually we ourselves judge as members of this community of reason, regarding the 18th century. Or we step on the ground of this evaluation (even if only hypothetically) and then find that this idea rapidly gains and will take over ever further circles, forms ever lager areas of culture and thereby some progressive development takes place, by which humanity and its culture ever further takes on the character of some culture of reason, that is, that of one carried by the spirit of the categorical imperative. We then find in the 19th century that this progress stops, that this idea loses its force, is skeptically suspended, and again we find some progressing regression. Another idea is formed, the national idea, not as some general cultural idea, but as a reigning one or a pervasive within every nation: the national idea as an egotistic idea of power and as an egotistic idea of increasing the own nation’s self-value. This idea has some contagious effect, without being an absolute idea of value. The absolute idea of value of demanding one’s own nation’s absolute value and of one’s own prior to all else (as in mother’s love and child’s love) is absolute indeed, but this is not an egotistic idea, and not that of nationalism. The demand of one’s own absolute value in a way making it impossible for another one to even strive for an absolute value, in the way of enslavement, is a crime and not something absolutely valuable demanded by the categorical imperative. Egotistic ideas can also be taken over in the way of contagion, but not in the way of an absolute value that is taken over into identity and may not be imitated. Even there, where I as an ethical man take another one’s ethical value as an example and imitate it, I thereby gain the other one’s value as an idea, and this value is identically the same, which the other one actualizes within himself. I cannot do otherwise then than want his value as much as my own, although I am my next in actualization, but possibly still sacrifice myself due to the recognized much higher value of the other one. I cognize the other one’s value as my own to such a degree that I give my life for his when I rescue him in danger.

Thus egotism in the shape of national egotism, wrongly presenting itself as an absolute value, becomes the ruling idea and in one with that the egotism as such. Absolute values of ideas always interlink with egotistic ones by their being egotistically dressed and devaluated. The national “welfare” demands some economic prosperity, the presupposition for all prosperity of art and science and other mental [122] absolute values, it is thus to be demanded as well at the expense of foreign nations, and thus the world is utilized as an exclusive acquisition of the nation with regard to its material usefulness, or ruthlessly strived for. Science likewise is a value, scientific technique and industry is made possible by it, this again is a value, because it may nurture large masses of the people, lead them towards useful work, etc. But now all is performed without questioning the ethical absolute limits in a measureless way, absolutized or rather, made a national matter in limitless heightening, that of national egotism. Everything, science, art and whatever may be considered absolutely as a mental good, becomes the object of national divination, national ware of the market and power, means of power.

The ethical mind, the mind of the cultural will from absolute reason, does not stop being effective within single ones, but it fights a defensive fight instead of progressing victoriously. We thus may possibly call the age of progressing (and universal realms of culture and ever larger communities within the whole community of newly forming) effectiveness of the idea of humanity of reason an age of reason. This idea then the one determining the whole development in a reigning way, it represents the spirit of the time. An age of reason would be called thus in a higher form, in which this spirit had rooted already within all partisan communities, and had become the power of development. This spirit would have to live in every individual ideally, or would have to be regarded in general consciousness as naturally belonging to the normal individual.

Appendix XI: Shaw and the occident’s force of life[[11]](#footnote-10)

“The doom of the occident”, this newest theory of some fainthearted philosophical skepticism, how could it scare us much in a time that Shaw’s comedies conquer the hearts everywhere and instill the belief, which supports all true science and all true life and scatters any kind of skepticism. It is us indeed, in which the “occident” lives, whether in degradation or in heightening – as we wish. God had drawn his hand from us? God’s power lives and is perfected nowhere else than within us, in our will true to the root. Where else does he, the living God, work than within our lives, within our pure will, that, which is true down into its final roots, that, which does not wish for nothing else, but for that, which we cannot well leave alone without having to give up our life as a senseless one.

Bernard Shaw is not the only one in whom such convictions changing the most inner will of life have grown and wish to become a revolutionary [123] force of European civilization. Nobody is comparable to him in width and strength – thanks to his method. His passionate reaction against naturalism, which killed true humanity, the life from personal self-responsibility as well as against its accompaniment, the art of the aesthetes, the science of the specialists, the religion of the conventionalized churches, etc. is performed in the language of artificial formations. His art breaks with an unbelievable force the limits between life’s actuality of the spectator and its imagelike shapings, it becomes in his hands the power of life itself and of its socioethical and religious renewal. It hits us right in the heart with the constant repeating *de te fabula narratur*, not as merely private men, but as members of the social surrounding world. Shaw is an incomparable awakener of the social conscience and of the belief that no world being for us is merely, but that each one is exactly that, which we let it become or make it with force or weakness, from conscientiousless egotism or from the power of our true freedom. In one word, the artist Shaw is the most efficient preacher of European present and its most radical critical disciplinarian, inexhaustible in discovering all mendacities and well-meant falsities, all intellectual and practical prejudices in all conceivable disguises. But nobody supersedes him in pure philanthropy, in front of which all hate melts away, and in true truthfulness, neither sparing itself. A genuine philosophical trait of his art lies within the universality of its sociopsychological analysis and exemplary creation, which does not halt in halfness to present men and fate in singularization, but puts it into the concrete connection of unity of the whole social culture as its social milieu, and makes it effective in its universal meaning and force of motivation. That Shaw’s spell against naturalism reads: I am, simply this word designates – as a scientific theme – quite another kind of method of life’s renewal – which walks the way of a genuine science serving life, instead of a genuine art serving life. Of course I mean that of “phenomenological philosophy” by that. Its working field lies within solitude, which is difficultly accessible, that of the “mothers” of all cognition. Because it is with regard to the renewal of science due to the most radical self-investigation of sense in all its original sources within life, within the “I live”, and “we live in community”, in other words, on the basis of some radical self-explanation of life, in which science itself grows and grows as some serving function of a true life. Needed is the production of some science understanding and justifying itself to the very last, on the way over the last possible enhancement of impartiality, going back to the last conceivable limit of disbelief, in order to gain the unbreakabilities, the fundamental necessities of belief, the ζιξώματα πάντων. And it needs to be shown that the only true sense of science is to create the clear mental eye into the universal life, according to which it can understand itself and the sense of purpose, and can practically become that, which [124] Bernard Shaw for his part desires and wishes. Thus we are comrades in the final goal, just that I am the lucky one allowed to enjoy his art, learn and strengthen myself by it. And thus the other-worldly philosopher has a right, to join in speaking here and expressing his warm gratitude as well.

1. Unpublished article for *The Kaizo* 1922/23. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. This first type deserved a special name. The culture is here „naturally grown“ culture? But more appropriate! [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. View appendix IV, page 100 [German edition] on that. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. Compare on this appendix V, page 103 [German edition]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. Compare appendix VI and VII on that, page 105 and page 107 [German edition]. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. Compare appendix VIII on that, page 108 [German edition]. Compare also appendices IX and X, pages 109 and 113 [German edition]. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. \* 1. The idea of a culture of reason enters Greek consciousness and has its impact to some degree as a not practical ideal. 2. It is a practical ideal for Plato with regard to the polis. But it did not become a practical ideal seriously accepted in a progressive way. Only in modern times. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. \* Community consciousness. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. \* universal and systematic [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. \* Humanity is directed towards its idea as an artist is towards his. The idea is always determined in its perfection. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. This text is to be dated to about the middle of the 1920s. Compare the paragraph On the text’s organization, below on page 260f [German edition]. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)